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Abstract
We conduct trust games in three villages in a northeastern Romanian commune. From 1775-1919, these
villages were arbitrarily assigned to opposite sides of the Austrian and Ottoman/Russian border despite
being located seven kilometers apart. All three villages were ruled by outsiders to Romania, with Russian
and Ottoman fiscal institutions being more rapacious. We conjecture that this history, combined with
historical selective migration, contributed to a culture of trust of outsiders (relative to co-villagers) on the
Austrian side of the border. Our design permits us to test this conjecture, and more generally, whether
historically-derived cultural norms are transmitted intergenerationally. We find that participants on the
Austrian side that also have family roots in the village are indeed more likely to trust outsiders but less
likely to trust co-villagers.
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Introduction

Although it may seem obvious to a casual observer that “culture matters” for economic and political decisionmaking, it is not so obvious how it matters. How do we distinguish between cultural stimuli and economic,
political, or institutional stimuli? To what degree do these stimuli feed into each other? Indeed, how
do we even begin to quantify culture? The difficulty in providing satisfactory answers to these questions
long dissuaded social scientists from investigating the connection between culture and political/economic
outcomes, eschewing it as either untestable or unimportant.
However, culture has received a much revived interest from social scientists in the last two decades. While
the term “culture” can mean many things, this literature generally conceptualizes culture as distinct from
economic and institutional stimuli by defining it as the heuristics employed by people within a society to
interpret the complex world around them (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich et al. 2001; Wedeen 2002;
Nunn 2012; Mokyr 2016; Greif and Mokyr 2016; Alston et al. 2016; Roland 2017; Giuliano and Nunn 2017).1
Within economics and political science, the causes and consequences of trust have received special attention.
Trust is crucial to economic and political development (Arrow 1972; Putnam 1993; Whiteley 2000; Uslaner
and Brown 2005; Karlan et al. 2009; Tabellini 2010; Algan and Cahuc 2010, 2013; Butler et al. 2016), and
those heuristics that people use to determine whether or not to trust others and under which conditions to
trust others clearly differ by society (Henrich et al. 2001). There are also practical reasons social scientists
have recently focused on trust: there are numerous measures of trust collected in survey data (Fisman and
Khanna 1999; Zak and Knack 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Bahry et al. 2005; Hooghe et al. 2009;
Aghion et al. 2010; Durante 2010; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Kasara 2013; Becker et al. 2016); and trust
experiments are among the most widely used in experimental studies, both in the lab and in the field (Berg
et al. 1995; Glaeser et al. 2000; Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Fehr et al. 2002; Barr 2003; Karlan 2005;
Sutter and Kocher 2007; Sapienza et al. 2013; Robinson 2016).
The most difficult issue the literature faces is one of identification: how do we know when a determinant is “culture” and when it is some (potentially unobservable or institutional) variable related to culture?
Convincing identification strategies used to separate cultural determinants from other economic, political,
1 Following

from important works such as Putnam (1993) and Greif (1994, 2006), the recent literature seeks historical channels
through which distinct cultural attributes formed and still affect decision-making heuristics in the present. For instance, Guiso
et al. (2016) subject Putnam’s hypothesis to a rigorous empirical test, showing that differences in medieval institutions and
the resulting social capital differences had an impact in northern Italy but not in southern Italy. Greif’s work falls into a much
broader literature which views institutions as the carriers of carriers of the historical—and hence cultural—past. Also see North
(1990), David (1994), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), La Porta et al. (1998), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Tabellini (2008a), Dell
(2010), Voigtlaender and Voth (2012), Alesina et al. (2013), Jha (2013), Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017), Greif and Tabellini
(2017), and Dell and Olken (2017). For excellent overviews of recent developments in the culture and institutions literature, see
Guiso et al. (2006), Nunn (2012), and Alesina and Giuliano (2015). For important overviews of recent works on the cultural
transmission of traits and its effect on long run economic development, see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) and Gershman (2017).
Of particular relevance to the current paper is Algan and Cahuc (2013), who provide a nice review of the literature on trust
and economic outcomes, and Nannestad (2008), who overviews the literature on generalized trust.

1

sociological, or institutional determinants have included instrumental variables (Uslaner and Brown 2005;
Tabellini 2010; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011), regression discontinuity (Grosfeld et al. 2013; Grosfeld and
Zhuravskaya 2013; Karaja 2013; Becker et al. 2016; Buggle 2016), and laboratory or field experiments (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Cassar et al. 2013; Adida et al. 2016; Bigoni et al. 2016; Butler et al. 2016;
Robinson 2016; Lowes et al. 2017; Jeon et al. 2017).2 Yet, there are tradeoffs inherent in each of these
approaches. Instrumental variables are excellent at removing the bias from the regression coefficients in
question and counteracting omitted variable biases inherent in historical data, but they often cannot provide much additional insight into the pathway through which culture is transmitted and affects outcomes.3
Regression discontinuity analyses address this concern—so long as there are not multiple important causal
implications of the discontinuity in question—but they come with the tradeoff that discontinuities are frequently not completely exogenous. Long borders, the most commonly used feature over which regression
discontinuity analyses are employed, are rarely random along the entirety of the border; they are often
formed by geographical barriers, the commercial importance of the region, and the capacity of the center to
collect taxes from either side of the border.4 Finally, most experiments seeking to understand how people
with different cultural backgrounds behave in different environments do indeed shed significant light on how
people act—often in contradiction to conventional economic theory—but they have difficulty isolating the
cultural determinants of subjects’ actions.5
Our paper aims to address some of these tradeoffs by combining a “lab in the field” experiment with a
natural experiment.6 The idea is straight-forward: if one can find a natural experiment in which a historical
border was arbitrarily drawn, even if over a small expanse, and there is reason to believe that there are
historical mechanisms on either side of the border affecting culture, one can more finely pinpoint the degree
2 Some

papers have also exploited historical patterns that are likely only explicable through culture. For instance, Gangadharan
et al. (2017) run lab in the field experiments in Cambodia, showing that participants who were directly affected by the Khmer
Rouge genocide exhibit more anti-social behavior in the present. Algan and Cahuc (2010) exploit variation in immigration
patterns to the US to isolate the inherited component of trust and test its impact on economic outcomes. Giuliano (2007) also
exploits immigration patterns to the US to isolate cultural differences between southern and northern Europeans with respect
to how long children live with their parents. Giuliano’s findings suggest that culture accounts for several stylized facts that
purely social scientific explanations cannot account for. More insight into inter-generational cultural transmission is provided
by Giuliano and Nunn (2017), who find that groups whose ancestors lived in more stable environments place a greater emphasis
on maintaining tradition in the present.
3 A large theoretical literature addresses the mechanisms through which cultural transmission occurs. Bisin and Verdier (2001),
Tabellini (2008b), and Guiso et al. (2008) focus primarily on the intra-family transmission process, while Dohman et al. (2012)
highlight the role of assortative mating and the local environment. Bisin and Verdier (2017), Kimbrough et al. (2008), Greif
and Tadelis (2010), and Iyigun and Rubin (2017) provide arguments for how culture and institutions interact.
4 While one can run a test for pre-existing differences on either side of the discontinuity (e.g., Becker et al. 2016), such data
from the pre-existing period are often much worse due to their historical nature and are subject to omitted variable bias. One
example of a set of long, exogenous borders are those created in the ”scramble for Africa”. The borders were created in a
European board room with little concern for ethnic or geographical boundaries (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016).
5 For instance, if subjects from northern and southern Italy act differently in trust games (Bigoni et al. 2016), it is possible that
this is due to differences in social capital between the two regions (Putnam 1993) or some other cultural factor; and there are
many other differences between the two regions which are difficult to account for in an experimental setting.
6 For a recent survey of the “lab in the field” literature, with all its benefits and pitfalls, see Gneezy and Imas (2016). A similar
“lab in the field on a natural experiment” method is used to provide insight into public good provision in India (Chaudhary et
al. 2017).
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to which cultural differences persisted by running laboratory experiments on subjects on either side of the
border. The primary challenges of such an undertaking are: i) finding an arbitrarily drawn border—as noted
above, most long borders are not arbitrary; ii) finding a border in which there is reason to believe there
were cultural differences generated by the border; and iii) isolating the border effects from other economic
determinants which may also be different on either side of the border.
We address these challenges by running trust games on either side of an old Austrian (Habsburg) border
in the Udeşti Commune located in northeastern Romania. This commune provides an ideal setting for testing
the role that historically-generated cultural differences played in generating modern-day trust behavior for
four reasons. First, a “natural experiment” occurred within the commune after it was annexed by the
Austrians following the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, in which the Ottomans ceded the Bukovina
region of Moldavia to the Austrians (see Figure 1). One of the villages in the commune, Ştirbăt, was left
on the Ottoman side despite there being a more natural river border to the north of Ştirbăt (see Figure
2). Historical records indicate that this decision was due in large part to the idiosyncratic predilections of
one landowner in Ştirbăt, not some economic or geographical calculus. This “natural experiment” therefore
satisfies the arbitrariness criterion. The border was not created by economic, military, or even geographical
considerations, but was the result of the idiosyncratic desires of one individual over two centuries ago.
Second, a large literature suggests that the decentralized, efficient, and (relatively) corruption-free Austrian administration fostered trust in government (Becker et al. 2016; Karaja 2013; Dimitrova-Grajzl 2007;
Subtelny 2007; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2013), while the Ottoman administrative system known as the
malikane system was rapacious (İnalcık 1973; Coşgel et al. 2013). This helped contribute to a relative
paucity of trust in the former Ottoman lands (Dimitrova-Grajzl 2007; Karaja 2013). Although Moldavia
(i.e., the region containing Ştirbăt) entered the Russian sphere of influence in 1829, Russian administration
was similarly rapacious (Subtelny 2007; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2013). Since all three of these empires
were outsiders to Romania, we conjecture that these histories should have affected the “cultural lens” through
which individuals on either side of the border trusted outsiders more generally. In other words, our experiment is designed to test whether people from villages that were “treated” with Austrian rule (as opposed to
Ottoman rule, which had existed in the region since the 15th century) trust outsiders more than those that
were not treated. Moreover, there is evidence of selective migration into (non-Austrian) Ştirbăt in the late
18th century. The first settlers were either forced to settle (as part of Madame Ştirbeţ’s corvée) or migrated
due to dislike of their new Austrian overlords. Importantly, both of these phenomena—administrative differences and selective migration—suggest that a culture of relative “trust of outsiders” may have emerged
in the late 18th and 19th centuries on the Austrian side of the border.7 The historical border therefore
7 For

more on the very large literature on in-group favoritism, see Tajfel et al. (1971), Brewer (1999), Brown (2000), Bahry et al.
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Figure 1: The Austrian-Ottoman Border in the Late-18th Century

satisfies the cultural difference criterion. There is reason to believe that cultural differences were generated
by historical events on other side of the border and are not merely associated with the border for spurious
reasons.
Third, the commune was reunified in 1919, meaning that for nearly a century the commune has shared
common governance, fiscal institutions, communist legacies, and many other features one might expect would
affect contemporary trust. The natural experiment therefore satisfies the historical channel criterion. PostWorld War I economic and political events cannot explain differences between the villages, since they have
been subject to the same forces for nearly a century. While it is likely true that political and economic
(2005), Yuki et al. (2005), Tanis and Postmes (2005), Ruffle and Sosis (2006), Balliet, Wu, and de Dreu (2014), and Robinson
(2016).
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Figure 2: Udeşti, Poieni, and Ştirbăt Villages

differences persist in general on either side of the old Austrian-Ottoman border, one of the advantages of our
methodology is that the three villages under study are small enough that any such differences would have
been unlikely to survive the Communist period, in which the villages were placed under the same communal
leadership. Hence, if differences in trust across villages are found, especially if they are in the expected
direction, cultural differences generated by the historical border are a plausible root cause.
Finally, our experiment allows us to parse whether those whose families have lived in the villages for
multiple generations—and were thus presumably more imbued with the culture of their ancestors—exhibit
different trust behavior than those who are relative newcomers. Ancestral information was obtained in a
post-experiment survey. Should such differences arise, they would provide further evidence that the intergenerational transmission of culture underlies our results rather than some unobserved differences between
the villages.
The experimental design entails playing trust games in two villages on the Austrian side of the border
(Udeşti and Poieni)8 and one on the Ottoman/Russian (hence, non-Austrian) side (Ştirbăt). Figure 2
depicts just how close these villages are to each other; each is within walking distance of the other two
villages. Ideally we would have run trust games in a second village on the non-Austrian side, but Ştirbăt is
the only village in the commune that satisfies this criterion. Participants in all villages played trust games
with both co-villagers and people from one of the other villages (hence, outsiders). Our “treated” group is
8 Udeşti

is the name of both the commune as well as a village in the commune. To avoid confusion, we refer to the former as the
“Udeşti Commune” throughout the paper.
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therefore those whose villages were treated with Austrian institutions (Udeşti and Poieni), while our control
group is those whose village was not (Ştirbăt). We also analyze actions between the two treated (Austrian)
villages, under the hypothesis that there should be no differences, on average, in actions between the two.
Our findings support the conjecture that historically-induced culture affects contemporary trust and that
inter-generational transmission is a plausible mechanism. First, we find that participants on the treated
(Austrian) side of the border have greater trust of subjects from outside their village (i.e., they send more
tokens). Meanwhile, no (significant) differences in trust behavior are found between the two treated villages. Second, we find that these inter-village differences in trust of outsiders only arise for subjects whose
grandparents are from the village in question. We interpret this result as evidence of an inter-generational
transmission mechanism; it is only those subjects whose families experienced the institutional differences of
1774-1919—or, at the very least, subjects whose grandparents grew up with people that experienced these
differences—that showed differences in trust of outsiders.9
We do not wish to over-interpret our results for three reasons. First, these findings will be difficult, if
not impossible, to replicate. In such small villages, one would be worried about playing the same game
twice. Second, in one respect we identify cultural differences off of three village-level observations. In such
a micro-level study, it is possible that some unknown, benign event in one of the villages’ historical past is
responsible for our results. Third, the external validity of our methodology is not obvious. Such issues are
not faced with larger-N studies that employ IV or regression discontinuity to identify cultural differences.
For this reason, we do not advocate that a “low-N” study like ours be the first attempt at identifying cultural
persistence across different populations. Instead, we suggest that such studies be done in conjunction with
other high-N studies employing some other technique to address identification. In the specific historical case
we study, such studies have been undertaken (Dimitrova-Grajzl 2007; Karaja 2013; Becker et al. 2016),
supporting the external validity of our results. Hence, since our study addresses precisely the primary
tradeoffs faced by other methodologies used to address cultural persistence, the present study should be
viewed as complementary to existing studies. Indeed, the fact that our results are consistent with much of
the literature cited above lends credibility to both sets of results.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 overviews the relevant historical facts of the villages in which
we conduct the experiment. Section 3 summarizes the experimental procedure. Section 4 informally maps
out a theory, based on the literature, of what we should expect to see in the experiment if the cultural
transmission of trust norms is indeed salient. Section 5 reports the results, and Section 6 concludes.

9 Vertical

cultural transmission cannot account for all of our results. Among participants whose grandparents are not from the
village, those from the Austrian side of the border trust co-villagers less than those from the non-Austrian side. We consider
explanations for these results in Section 5.
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2

Historical Background: The Udeşti Commune

2.1

Austrian, Ottoman, and Russian Administration

There were numerous institutional differences between the Austrian Habsburg Empire and its two eastern
neighbors, the Ottoman Empire and Russian Empire, which may affect contemporary trust. Perhaps the
most important Austrian institutional feature for the present study was the relative autonomy of local
governance (including in Romania, as we highlight in the next section). The Habsburgs had long permitted
(though perhaps not desired) strong free independent cities, which were independent centers of political,
economic, and cultural activity. Administrative and cultural autonomy was also the norm in the more
peripheral Austrian territories, where locals manned the bureaucracy and were permitted wide purview over
economic, religious, and cultural matters (Subtelny 2007; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2013). Indeed, there is
a large literature, summarized by Becker et al. (2016), suggesting that the Austrian bureaucracy was known
for its honesty, diligence, fairness, efficiency, and freedom from corruption. When the Habsburgs acquired
new territories, locals were sent to Vienna for extensive administrative training before returning to work in
the bureaucracy. As a result, the Austrian bureaucracy was largely respected by the population, even in
newly acquired territories where the Austrians were ostensibly “outsiders” (Becker et al. 2016).
In contrast, the Russians rarely compromised on their autocratic prerogatives or gave political power to
local elites. Local elites were given socio-economic privileges in order to ensure their subservience to the
tsar, who imposed oppressive cultural, social, and economic policies on regions that were not fully integrated
or assimilated into the empire (Subtelny 2007; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2013). As a result, there were few
local power bases outside of the central government, and the ties between local elites and the masses were
much weaker than they were in the Habsburg lands (Subtelny 2007). In other words, the relatively rapacious
elites in Russian governance would have been viewed as outsiders, especially in peripheral territories like
Romania. Meanwhile, the Ottoman political structure became decentralized after the 17th century, as local
notables acquired control over most local political and economic affairs (İnalcık 1973; Barkey 1994; Coşgel
et al. 2013). But unlike the Austrian regime, which maintained a tight relationship with the local nobility
and therefore maintained some level of control over corruption, Ottoman decentralization was a result of the
center’s inability to collect revenue or provide local law and order. The Ottoman central authorities could
do little to prevent corruption and expropriation.10
10 Dimitrova-Grajzl

(2007) points to other institutional and legal advantages provided by the Austrians, including protection of
property rights, relative freedom from corruption, autonomy for local governance, and provision of public goods. With respect
to property rights, the Austrians permitted private ownership as early as the 17th century, abolished serfdom in the late 18th
century, increased peasants’ rights, ended censorship, and ensured freedom of enterprise in 1859. Meanwhile, the Ottomans
did not permit private ownership until the 19th century (all land belonged to the Sultan) and permitted local military lords to
take arbitrary levies and surcharges, resulting in massive extortion and oppression of the masses, especially in the southeastern
European Ottoman provinces. The deteriorating Ottoman fiscal situation encouraged predatory behavior on the part of tax

7

In short, the institutional differences between the Austrian, Ottoman, and Russian Empires relevant for
this study are autonomy of local governance, freedom from corruption, and protection of property rights. A
growing literature suggests that these differences helped shape cultural attitudes that have persisted to the
present day. Becker et al. (2016) employ a regression discontinuity around the old Habsburg border and find
that Habsburg affiliation increases trust with respect to government institutions and reduces corruption (i.e.,
bribery) in contemporary courts and police. They argue that norms of functional citizen-state interactions,
along with a decentralized and honest bureaucracy, affected trust in local public services and levels of
corruption in local administration. Karaja (2013) uses a similar design across the old Austrian-Ottoman
border and finds higher willingness to bribe, lower trust of public officials, and lower growth in GDP per
capita in the old Ottoman lands. Dimitrova-Grajzl (2007) uses a variety of econometric techniques and finds
that Habsburg successor states have more efficient market economies, greater protection of property rights,
lower risk of government exploitation of private investors, lower levels of corruption, higher trust in the
government, greater governmental effectiveness, and stronger civil society than Ottoman successor states.
These outcomes can all be explained by the differences in Austrian and Ottoman institutions highlighted
in this section. Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2013) find that within Poland, Habsburg and Russian legacies
affect contemporary voting patterns, with people in former Habsburg lands being more likely to vote for both
liberals and religious conservatives. They cite Austrian local autonomy, especially with regard to religious
issues, as the reason for support of religious conservatives, while differences in governance institutions affected
beliefs in democracy on both sides of the border and thus support for liberals.11
This literature therefore suggests that Austrian, Ottoman, and Russian institutional differences may
still affect a host of economic, cultural, and political features generally considered important for economic
development. Foremost among these is trust. Although the literature focuses on trust in government, we
conjecture that the fact that these empires were “outsiders” in Romania, in combination with the manner in
which the empires administered local governance, should have manifested itself in trust of “outsiders” more
generally. Austrian officials were “insiders”—local elites who became steeped in Austrian bureaucratic practices. Meanwhile, Ottoman and Russian government officials would have been outsiders to a vast majority
of their subjects. Their widespread corruption and imposition on property rights decreased trust in public
officials, and likely decreased trust in outsiders more generally.
A large experimental literature suggests that “outgroup” trust is in part culturally determined (Tajfel et
al. 1971; Brewer 1999; Brown 2000; Bahry et al. 2005; Yuki et al. 2005; Tanis and Postmes 2005; Ruffle and
farmers—illegal taxes and land reallocation were common—and the sultan was hesitant to intervene since this may have
worsened his fiscal straits (Coşgel et al. 2013; Karaja 2013).
11 In a related study, Grosjean (2011) finds that Ottoman rule is associated with lower contemporary financial development, even
within countries that were partially ruled by the Ottoman Empire.
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Sosis 2006; Robinson 2016), although it can also be generated in the lab (Chen and Li 2009).12 The Austrian,
Ottoman, and Russian institutional legacies therefore suggest the possibility—should the cultural differences
generated by these institutions over a century ago be sticky enough to exist in the present—that outgroup
trust should be greater for descendants of the Austrian Empire. In Section 4, we more formally lay out this
and other predictions related to differences in trust between those from the Austrian and non-Austrian sides
of the old border. Before we provide the intuition underlying these hypotheses, we provide the historical
background of the natural experiment in Romania that we exploit (in Section 2.2) and summarize the game
that participants on both sides of the border played (in Section 3).

2.2

The Udeşti Commune: A Brief History

The Udeşti Commune is located in the Moldavian region (Suceava County) of northeastern Romania.13 It
is comprised of 11 small villages over approximately 11.04 km2 (Udişteanu 2005), ranging from the very
small (Mănăstioara, which has 23 households), to the largest village Udeşti, which has approximately 1,100
households. There is evidence of human inhabitance of Udeşti from the Paleolithic and Neolithic eras, and
there has been permanent settlement since at least the late medieval period (Marţolea 1986). The largest of
the villages in terms of population and size, Udeşti, was formed no later than the 1580s; it was originally a
settlement for corvée workers of the royal court and other high officials (Marţolea 1986, p. 35).
Prior to 1775, the entire Udeşti Commune was part of the Bukovina region of Moldavia, a region which
spans parts of modern day Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine. Moldavia fell under indirect Ottoman control
in 1454, although it retained a degree of independence (Inalcik 1973, p. 27). Like other Christian vassal
principalities of the Ottoman Empire (e.g., Wallachia, Transylvania, Dubrovnik, Georgia, and Circassia),
Moldavia was ruled by its own princes as an Ottoman vassal state.
The major event in Udeşti history that we exploit in this paper is the partition following the signing of
the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. Under the terms of this treaty, which ended the Russo-Turkish War in 1774,
the Ottoman Empire ceded Bukovina to the Austrian Habsburg Empire (Udişteanu 2005).14 As can be
seen in Figures 1 and 2, the Udeşti Commune is located on the border of Bukovina and what would remain
Ottoman Moldavia. The citizens of Bukovina, including those in the Udeşti Commune, were required to
take an oath in 1777 to their new Austrian empress Maria Theresa.15
12 The

“ingroup favoritism” literature is a large and old one in psychology and sociology. Ruffle and Sosis (2006) note that
“hundreds of in-group-out-group bias studies fill psychology and sociology journals.” Indeed, this literature is large enough to
have warranted a meta-analysis; see Balliet, Wu, and De Dreu (2014).
13 The Udeşti Commune was not a commune until the 20th century, but we use this terminology to describe the entire area, as
opposed to the individual village of Udeşti.
14 The terms of the treaty permitted the Russian Empire to intercede when necessary on behalf of Eastern Orthodox Christians
living in Moldavia.
15 The “Oath of Faith to Austria” indicated Austria’s interest in Bukovinan tax revenue, which required legal, judicial, and
administrative apparatuses: “I, Maria Terezia, widow and sovereign empress of the Hungarian Land and of Bukovina, etc. ...

9

However, not all Udeşti residents were willing to live under Austrian rule. In 1777, one of the major
landowners in the village, Ruxanda Ştirbeţ, was called to submit an oath in the name of her village, Chilişeni,
to the new Austrian rulers (Chilişeni is located on the west bank of the Racova Creek, see Figure 2). Ştirbeţ
refused to participate in the ceremony, which she considered “to be despotic and a crippling of Moldavia”
(Marţolea 1986, p. 13). Afterwards, Ştirbeţ left her house in Chilişeni and moved to a nearly-unoccupied
parcel of land on the opposite side of the creek, which at the time was still part of Chilişeni.16 Ştirbeţ claimed
that this heretofore unproductive land was still part of Moldavian territory. When brought up before the
before the Austrian Inventory Commission on December 13, 1782, Ştirbeţ argued that “the largest part of
Chilişeni Village is in Moldavia and [Ştirbeţ] owns all the estate.” (Marţolea 1986, p. 12). Being nearly
uninhabited prior to Ştirbeţ’s move, there is no evidence one way or the other that it would have been
considered part of Bukovina (and thus ceded to the Austrians) prior to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. In
1786, the Austrians recognized Ştirbeţ’s claim and set a border stone on the right bank of Racova Creek,
between Chilişeni and Ştirbeţ’s new settlement, which would later bear her name, Ştirbăt. The Austrians
also placed a border station on the left side of the bank, clearly demarcating Austrian from Moldavian
(Ottoman) territory (Marţolea 1986, p. 13).
Soon after Ştirbăt was formed, its population grew as families from Bucovina, Transylvania, and Maramures, many of whom viewed themselves as Moldavian, escaped foreign occupation. Some were chased by
Austrian authorities and compelled to return to their lands; others refused and stayed in Ştirbăt. In short,
the initial population was comprised mostly of Madame Ştirbeţ’s corvée and selectively chosen migrants.17
These migrants tended to be good farmers and animal breeders, and they shortly blended in with the local
population, eventually gaining the right to own their own land. By 1828, there were 43 households in Ştirbăt,
and the Moldavian Treasury in 1845 showed 51 households (Marţolea 1986, p. 15). Most of the inhabitants
were slaves or corvée workers until the formation of the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia
in 1859. In 1864, Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza abolished slavery and made peasants landowners (Marţolea
1986, p. 53). This contrasts with Austrian Bukovina (i.e., Udeşti), where the Austrian government eliminated slavery on the commune immediately after taking control in 1775, issuing a decree permitting serfdom.
Austrian Bukovinan peasants were required to provide 3-6 days a week of unpaid work for the masters of

approach every person who is an inhabitant of Bukovina Districts, who lives here, or who owns lands here, who is our servant,
who pays tribute to us or who is worthy of our protection ... First of all we assure you of our imperial and royal mercy ... For
this, we need no more than for the inhabitants of this district of Bukovina, both the religious and the laic ones and the common
people who live here, to submit their oath and pledge to be our subjects, becoming our obedient taxpayers. Based on this oath,
they pledge to uphold the justice and the order that we instate, agreeing for us to take care of them and always have faith in
us and in the fact that we will always be just and correct with Bukovina district (quoted in Udişteanu 2005).”
16 According to census taken in 1772-74, this small village, known as Lăţcanii, contained 9 households consisting of three families,
a priest, and three poor women (Marţolea 1986, p. 14).
17 Today, Ştirbăt still has numerous families whose names are from the Bucovina, Transylvania, and Maramures regions (Marţolea
1986, p. 14).
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the estate (Marţolea 1986, p. 51). These regulations were relieved in 1835, when a decree by the Emperor
Ferdinand stated that all peasants’ land was henceforth their private property.
The villages in the Udeşti Commune under Austrian control (including Udeşti and Poieni, two of the
three villages in which we conduct the experiments) remained under Austrian rule until Romania established
control over Bukovina in 1919, following the collapse of Austria-Hungary after World War I. Moldavia
(including Ştirbăt) fell under various rulers following the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. Until the RussoTurkish War of 1828-29, it remained under both Ottoman and Russian spheres of influence. After the war,
it fell under Russian domination for three decades until the conclusion of the Crimean War. As part of the
Treaty of Paris (1856) in the aftermath of the Crimean War, Moldavia unified with Wallachia (to its south)
to form the independent state known as The United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. The United
Principalities were the predecessor to the Kingdom of Romania (1881-1947), which eventually incorporated
Bukovina in the Treaty of Saint Germain (1919). In 1947, the Kingdom of Romania was proclaimed the
Socialist Republic of Romania, and it remained under one party Communist rule until 1989. In 1950, under
the communist regime, the Udeşti Commune was organized as a commune managed by a Popular Council.
On December 24, 1960, an administrative reform placed the Udeşti Commune within the Suceava District
(Udişteanu 2005, ch. 1).
The upshots of this short history of the Udeşti Commune are: i) one village in the commune, Ştirbăt,
fell under non-Austrian rule for 144 years (1775-1919), while the rest of the commune, including Udeşti and
Poieni, fell under Austrian rule; ii) these differences were not the result of geography, military strategy, or
any of the conventional causes of territorial boundaries, but the predilections of one landowner (Ruxanda
Ştirbeţ); iii) part of the initial population of Ştirbăt was selectively chosen, as it consisted largely of people
escaping Austrian rule for some reason or another; iv) the commune has been reunified for nearly a century
(since 1919), and it has experienced a World War, an extended period under Communist rule, and the
post-Communist era as one commune.
These features combine for an ideal natural experiment to test whether trust norms are transmitted over
generations long after the cessation of the conditions under which those norms formed in the first place. First,
the boundary within the commune between the Austrian and Moldavian side is about as exogenous as one
could hope for, being generated primarily by the predilections of one landowner. Second, these villages fell
under the rule of very different regimes which, as outlined in Section 2.1 and later more formally in Section
4, suggest the possibility that different trust norms were formed over two centuries ago between the villages.
Third, to the extent that selection into non-Austrian Ştirbăt (and out of Austrian Udeşti and Poieni) existed
in the late-18th century, such selection should affect trust in same direction as the institutional differences
(i.e., residents of Ştirbăt should be less trusting of outsiders). As we discuss in greater detail in Section 4,
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this means that we must remain agnostic regarding the root cause of cultural differences (i.e., OttomanRussian-Austrian institutions or selective migration in the 18th century), but it does not undermine our
focus on the persistence of cultural norms. Finally, the villages have been united under the same national
and local governance for nearly a century, meaning that observed differences in trust behavior are not a
result of different experiences with communism or any other post-World War I phenomenon.
For the sake of the experiment, we consider the Austrian side of the border (Udeşti and Poieni) to be
“treated” with Austrian institutions from 1774-1919 and outmigration in the late 18th century. This is a
“treatment” because, prior to 1774, all of the villages in question had been under Ottoman rule for over
two centuries. Hence, there was no change in the basic institutional structure of the control village (Ştirbăt)
until at least 1859, when the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia formed. Meanwhile, Austrian
institutions prevailed in Udeşti and Poieni until 1919. In the following section, we detail the “lab in the
field” experiment designed to exploit this natural experiment.

3

A Lab in the Field on a Natural Experiment: Design and Implementation

3.1

Experiment Design and Instructions

We designed a “lab in the field” experiment to exploit the natural experiment discussed in Section 2.2.
Participants played simple trust games (as in Berg et al. 1995) in one village on the non-Austrian side of the
border, Ştirbăt, and two villages on the Austrian side of the border, Udeşti and Poieni. Participants played
simplified versions of trust games played hundreds of times in university laboratories.
Participants played the same trust game multiple times. In each game, they were first told the village of
residence of the person they would be matched with. They were then told whether they would be a “sender”
or “receiver”, although these terms were not used (see Appendix B for instructions in English and Appendix
C for instructions translated into Romanian). The exact identity of one’s partner was not known; matches
were randomly determined by a spreadsheet, so even the experimenters did not know the identity of the
matched pairs. Participants were given an incentivized quiz before making their decisions in the first game
in which they participated (see Appendix B.3).
The sender made one decision: how many of three tokens to send over to his or her partner. They made
this decision by simply circling 0, 1, 2, or 3 on a handout provided to them by an experimenter (see Figure
3). Participants were instructed that they would keep any tokens they did not send, while any tokens they
sent would be multiplied by 3 and given to the receiver. Each token was equivalent to 3 Romanian lei, or
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$0.75.
Figure 3: Handout Participants Filled Out to Make the Send Decision
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Circle one of the above numbers. The number you circle is the amount
of your 3 tokens you will send to the participant with whom you are
matched.
Please only circle one number. If you change your mind, cross out your
choice and make a new choice.
Senders were then told that receivers would make a choice of how many of the tokens they received to
return to the sender. Receivers made 3 decisions: how much to return to the sender conditional on the
sender sending 1, 2, or 3 tokens (see Figure 4). If the sender sent 0, there was nothing for the receiver to
return, so we circled “0” for participants. For each of the three decisions, receivers were allowed to circle
any number between 0 and three times the amount sent to them to return to the sender.
Figure 4: Handout Participants Filled Out to Make the Return Decision
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Participants first played the game as a sender, matched with a receiver from either their own or another
village, and then played the game as a receiver, matched with a different sender from that village. All
participants played the game at least four times (twice as a sender and twice as a receiver), matched with
co-villagers and outsiders. Instructions were similar, although abbreviated, for receivers. After participants
completed the final treatment they took a short demographic survey (see Appendix B.4 for details).

3.2

Treated and Control Groups

As of July 2016, there were around 1,100 households in (Austrian) Udeşti, 270 households in (Austrian)
Poieni, and 300 households in (non-Austrian) Ştirbăt. Since Udeşti is over three times the size of the other
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two villages, we recruited more subjects from Udeşti. In all, there were 200 participants from Udeşti and 100
participants from both Poieni and Ştirbăt, equaling 400 total participants. Given the unequal numbers from
each of the villages, we augmented the game slightly for participants from each of the villages in a manner
described below.
As described in Section 2, the treated group includes the 300 participants from the Austrian side of the
border (200 from Udeşti and 100 from Poieni). These villages were “treated” with Austrian institutions
and outmigration in the late 18th century. Meanwhile, the control group includes the 100 participants from
(non-Austrian) Ştirbăt. All participants played the game multiple times. In the first and third games they
played as a sender and in the second and fourth games they played as a receiver. One hundred of the
(Austrian) Udeşti participants played two games with people from Udeşti and the other two with people
from (non-Austrian) Ştirbăt while the other 100 played twice with co-villagers and twice with people from
(Austrian) Poieni. Meanwhile, both the 100 Poieni and 100 Ştirbăt participants played two games with
people from all three villages (in the fifth game they acted as sender and in the sixth as receiver, playing
with outgroup participants). To control for order effects, we split each of these groups into two, alternating
the order of game play. For a summary of the order of play see Table 1.
Table 1: Order of Play in the Treated and Control Groups
Village
Udeşti
Udeşti
Udeşti
Udeşti
Poieni
Poieni
Ştirbăt
Ştirbăt

3.3

Side of Border

Order
Treated
Austrian
Udeşti - Ştirbăt
Austrian
Ştirbăt - Udeşti
Austrian
Udeşti - Poieni
Austrian
Poieni - Udeşti
Austrian
Poieni - Udeşti - Ştirbăt
Austrian
Udeşti - Poieni - Ştirbăt
Control
non-Austrian
Ştirbăt - Udeşti - Poieni
non-Austrian
Udeşti - Ştirbăt - Poieni

N
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50

Experiment Implementation in the Udeşti Commune

We employed the Bucharest-based research firm Cult Market Research (CMR) to implement the experiments
on July 21-23, 2016. Six researchers from CMR carried out the experiments in secondary schools, spending
one day in each village. Prior to conducting the experiments, CMR made local contacts to serve as field
recruiters: 3 in Udeşti, 1 in Poieni, and 1 in Ştirbăt. These contacts were all well-known in their village and
were introduced to CMR by the mayor. The field recruiters worked with two CMR researchers to organize
the experiment (e.g., find a location) and sign up participants one week prior to implementation. The
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popularity of the field recruiters is one of the primary reasons we were able to achieve such high turnout for
the experiment. And, luckily, the weather was beautiful the three days CMR conducted the experiment.18
Importantly, CMR was never informed about the natural experiment this paper exploits. We had many
discussions with the CMR researchers regarding the implementation of the experiment, the villages involved,
and the manner in which they would collect and input data, but we never discussed the old Austrian border
central to our identification strategy. Hence, the experiment was double-blind, with neither participants nor
experimenters knowing the research questions.
CMR conducted the experiment with 20-30 participants at a time, all playing the same treatment. Instructions were read aloud in Romanian, and all instructions and handouts were translated into Romanian.
About 50% of participants needed additional explanations for at least one of the tasks, although all participants also took a quiz to test their understanding. Participants largely followed instructions and were silent
during the experiment except when asking questions. Each session took about one hour to complete.
On the day of the experiment, participants received a 10 lei ($2.50) show-up fee, paid before the experiment began (to engender the belief that participants would indeed be paid). They were told that they could
make much more during the experiment, and that in one week a representative of CMR would come back to
the village to pay their earnings (beyond the show-up fee). After the experiment was conducted, the CMR
researchers entered the data into a de-identified spreadsheet, which returned how much each participant
earned in the experiment (participants were identified by a number, and CMR kept a separate spreadsheet
that matched participants’ names to their ID number). A CMR researcher returned one week later to pay
participants their earnings. We unfortunately could not pay subjects their earnings immediately because
payouts were contingent on decisions made in other villages.

4

Testable Predictions

Before proceeding to the experimental results, we propose numerous predictions regarding the actions of the
participants. We do not propose a formal model in this section because the intuition for our predictions is
taken from the literature and is straight-forward. We therefore do not need a model to generate unexpected or
counter-intuitive predictions. We begin by listing predictions with respect to expected behavioral differences
and proceed to provide predictions that would hold true if the mechanism is inter-generational cultural
transmission.
First, we employ the literature on Austrian-Ottoman/Russian institutional differences overviewed in
18 It

is possible that field recruiters may have induced selectivity into the subject pool if, for example, one was less trusting of
outsiders than the others. Even though we have no reason to believe this was the case, we cannot rule it out. However, we note
that a non-trivial share of the entire village in each of the three villages participated in the experiment, limiting the effect that
recruiter selection could have on the results.
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Section 2.1. This literature helps us generate predictions regarding the actions of participants on either
side of the old border conditional on these differences being manifested to some degree today (possibly
through inter-generational cultural transmission, which we turn to shortly). This literature suggests that
the Austrian administration was relatively decentralized, efficient, well-respected, and free from corruption,
while Ottoman and Russian administration was rapacious and predatory, extracting the maximum rents
possible. It follows that people living in the Austrian lands should have had greater trust in government
(Becker et al. 2016). Importantly, this type of trust was not generated by social ties or local norms. Instead,
it was generated by those outside of one’s social group, especially on the non-Austrian side of the border,
where administrators’ ties to the local community were often weak. This is a key distinction, because trust
outside of one’s social group is difficult to generate (Balliet, Wu, and De Dreu 2014), but it is one of the keys
to facilitating impersonal exchange (Arrow 1972; Greif 1994, 2006).19 We therefore expect that, if norms
generated by institutional differences in the 18th-19th century are “sticky” enough to still exist, people
whose village was “treated” with Austrian institutions would trust outsiders more than people living on the
non-Austrian side.20
Moreover, Section 2.2 suggests that there may have been selection into non-Austrian Ştirbăt and out of
Austrian Udeşti in the late-18th century. Many migrants into Ştirbăt were native Moldavians escaping some
form of repression in the recently-annexed Bukovina territory. With respect to trust attitudes, it follows that
these migrants should have been more trusting of the people in the location they escaped to (Ştirbăt) and
less trusting of people in places they escaped from (Udeşti). On the one hand, this fact muddles the proposed
causal pathway, since the initial impetus causing differences in contemporary trust could be old AustrianOttoman-Russian institutional differences, late-18th century selection into non-Austrian Ştirbăt, or (likely)
some combination of the two. There is no way of separating these competing causes, and we remain agnostic
regarding which one is the driving force. However, the key question addressed in this paper is whether
cultural differences generated long ago persist, whatever their origin. On this front, we are fortunate that
selection into Ştirbăt yields the same prediction regarding trust of outsiders as do differences in Austrian and
non-Austrian administration. Regardless of the initial cause of cross-border cultural differences, evidence of
contemporary effects would indicate strong persistence.

19 Becker

et al. (2016) find no differences in either side of the old Austrian border on interpersonal trust in general. Their data
do not allow them to speak to the outgroup-ingroup distinction we make in this paper.
20 We cannot completely rule out the possibility that our experiment picks up trust (or mistrust) of people from the specific
“outsider” village in question, rather than trust or mistrust of outsiders in general. Likewise, we cannot completely rule out
the possibility that our results are reflective of different family structures across villages, which have been shown elsewhere
to be tied to distrust of outsiders (Alesina and Giuliano 2014; Greif and Tabellini 2017; Enke 2017). Yet, the benefit of the
natural experiment we exploit is that the salient difference across the villages was the political state in power. There is little
reason to believe there are fundamentally different family structures across villages. Indeed, the founder of (non-Austrian)
Ştirbăt (Madame Ruxanda Ştirbeţ) and her family had lived on the Austrian side of the border for at least a century before
the partition (Marţolea 1986, p. 12).
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In the context of the trust game experiment, administrative differences and selection into non-Austrian
Ştirbăt therefore yield the following prediction:
Prediction 1: Participants from the control village (non-Austrian Ştirbăt) will send less when playing the
game with outsiders than will participants from the treated villages (Udeşti and Poieni).
Within the treated villages, there will be no difference in the amount sent to outsiders.
The prediction with respect to how much one sends to co-villagers is not as straight-forward, as there
are two countervailing factors at play. On the one hand, if people from the Austrian side are simply more
trusting of others in general, including people from their own village, they should send more to co-villagers
than people from the non-Austrian side. On the other hand, lower trust of outsiders on the non-Austrian
side (Prediction 1) may have made intravillage trust all the more important, as the possibilities for exchange
outside the village would have been lower (Greif 1994). If this effect is strong, it would entail that people on
the non-Austrian side are more likely to trust co-villagers. Since it is unclear ex ante which effect is stronger
and our experiment does not allow us to parse trust into these two countervailing effects, we do not make
predictions with respect to trust of co-villagers. We can, however, make a statement about relative trust: i.e.,
how trusting people are of co-villagers relative to outsiders. The above discussion suggests that people from
the non-Austrian side may be more trusting of co-villagers than people from the Austrian side, in which case
(in combination with Prediction 1) the difference in trust between co-villagers and outsiders would be greater
on the non-Austrian side. Yet, even if people from the non-Austrian side are less trusting of co-villagers
because their general level of trust is lower, if this is at all counteracted by historic exchange opportunities,
the difference in trust between co-villagers and outsiders should still be greater on the non-Austrian side, all
else equal. In the context of the experiment, this insight yields the following prediction:
Prediction 2: The difference in the amount sent when playing the game with co-villagers versus outsiders
will be greater for participants from the control village (non-Austrian Ştirbăt) than those
from the treated villages (Udeşti and Poieni).
Next, we turn to the “return” decision made in the second stage of the trust game. The return decision
does not measure trust. Instead, it measures trustworthiness; the receiver rewards a sender for trusting them,
and they will have no further interaction nor will they ever know each other’s identities. Trustworthiness
is different from trust because it is conditional ; it is only expressed when the other person exhibits trust
in the first place. Nothing we know of in the Austrian-Ottoman-Russian literature sheds light on whether
we should expect to see stronger trustworthiness from participants on one side of the border. Hence, we
do not make a prediction with respect to the return decision. But these decisions are still important for
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our interpretation of the send decision. As Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) note, a sender could rationally
mistrust the other group if participants from the other group are indeed likely to return less on average.
This yields an interpretation that players are simply acting rationally, and that “statistical discrimination”
may be an optimal strategy in the absence of other information. Hence, in the analysis we will note whether
there is any evidence for rational statistical discrimination.
Finally, we turn to the cultural transmission mechanism. The most commonly accepted mechanism in
the economics literature is the one proposed by Bisin and Verdier (2001), in which parents transmit their
preferences to their children as a form of “parental altruism” (also see Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Dohmen
et al. 2012; Giuliano and Nunn 2017; Bisin and Verdier 2017; Iyigun and Rubin 2017; Roland and Yang
2017). This type of cultural transmission is denoted as vertical transmission (i.e., from parent to child).
These preferences may also spread through the population either horizontally via peer group or obliquely
via teaching (Bisin and Verdier 2008; Tabellini 2008; Guiso et al. 2008). Indeed, preferences may not even
be transmitted directly from parent to child; transmission from one generation to the next can occur if
children randomly sample the preferences of individuals from the older generation and take the average as
their own preference (Boyd and Richerson 1985). While we cannot speak to the exact mechanism, given
the simplicity of our experiment, our questionnaire does allow us to test an implication of the Bisin and
Verdier model.21 If cultural transmission occurred in the villages, people whose families have lived in the
village for multiple generations should be more likely to have the cultural traits predicted in Predictions 1
and 2.22 To test this conjecture, the questionnaire administered after the experiment asked participants how
long their families have lived in the village in question. While we arbitrarily set the cut-off in Prediction 3
at whether one’s grandparents are from the village, we also test whether this prediction holds with respect
to great-grandparents (results are reported in the Appendix).
Prediction 3: If cultural transmission occurred in the villages in the study, Predictions 1 and 2 should hold
more strongly for participants whose grandparents (and previous generations) are from the
village.

21 We

cannot speak directly to the idea that trust behavior is vertical transmitted via genetics. For instance, Cesarini et al. (2008)
find that about half of variation in trust game behavior arises from genetic variation. Yet, the results we present in Section 5
indicate that it is not trust in general that differs by village but trust of outsiders. This finding is difficult to reconcile with a
purely genetic view.
22 Our questionnaire obtains family information via the question “To your knowledge, how long has your family lived in [village]?”
(Question #7, available in Appendix B.4). The possible answers are “You moved to [village] during your lifetime,” “Your
parents moved to [village],” “Your grandparents moved to [village],” “Your great-grandparents or an older generation moved to
[village],” and “I don’t know.” We recognize that different subjects could take this question differently (i.e., some may answer
“grandparents” if one grandparent is from the village while others may answer only if all four are). While this is a possibility,
there is little reason why the propensity to answer in one way or another would differ across the three villages in question.
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5

Results

5.1

Demographic Summary Statistics

Before presenting the results of the experiment, we present balance tests across the treatment and control
groups on basic demographic characteristics, derived from the survey administered after the experiment. The
results are summarized in Table 2. Such balance is important; Alesina and la Ferrara (2002) suggest that
poor educational or occupational outcomes (among other things) are associated with low trust. Hence, if our
participant sample is skewed, it might be these demographic features driving any treatment differences we
find, not “cultural” differences. Fortunately, our sample is mostly balanced. Around half of the participants
were female in both the (Austrian) treatment and (non-Austrian) control groups. Likewise, there are no
statistically significant differences between the average age or education level between participants within the
treated and control groups. The average age in all three villages is in the mid-40s, around half of participants
have a high school education. While an overwhelming majority of participants in all three villages are Eastern
Orthodox, the proportion is higher in Ştirbăt than in the treated villages (0.88 vs. 0.96, p = 0.023).23 The
other demographic characteristic that is statistically different between the treated and control groups is
marital status. More participants in the treated group are married (0.65) than in the control village Ştirbăt
(0.53).
Table 2: Summary Statistics, Demographics

Female

Age

Married

High School
or Above

Eastern
Orthodox

Austrian
(Udeşti and Poieni)

0.53
(0.03)
N = 300

45.91
(1.04)
N = 279

0.65
(0.03)
N = 298

0.51
(0.03)
N = 295

0.88
(0.02)
N = 296

Non-Austrian
(Ştirbăt)

0.52
(0.05)
N = 100

43.01
(2.03)
N = 94

0.53
(0.05)
N = 98

0.45
(0.05)
N = 94

0.96
(0.02)
N = 97

0.863

0.153

0.033*

0.273

0.023*

Side of Border

p-value: Diff in Means

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.

For the sake of a trust experiment, it is also desirable to have balance across occupations. It is possible
that past institutional differences affect income or occupational mobility in the present, which itself could
affect trust norms. To address this possibility, we report in Table 3 the participants’ self-reported occupation.
23 Importantly,

the villages in the Udeşti commune have been overwhelmingly Eastern Orthodox since the time of the partition
in 1774. Indeed, one of the first things Madame Ştirbeţ did (in 1781) upon moving to the new village of Ştirbăt was have a
church built (Marţolea 1986, p. 12)
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This is our best indication of participants’ economic status. While the unemployed (including housewives,
house-husbands, retirees, and students) are over-represented, likely due to the nature of recruiting for a field
experiment, there are no statistically significant differences in any of the set of occupations.
Table 3: Summary Statistics, Occupations
Side of Border

Housewife

Student

Retired

Unemployed

Agric

Service

Blue Collar

Austrian
(Udeşti and Poieni)
N = 284

0.26
(0.03)

0.09
(0.02)

0.24
(0.03)

0.06
(0.01)

0.10
(0.02)

0.11
(0.02)

0.13
(0.02)

Non-Austrian
(Ştirbăt)
N = 90

0.28
(0.05)

0.13
(0.04)

0.24
(0.05)

0.07
(0.03)

0.04
(0.02)

0.10
(0.03)

0.12
(0.03)

p-value: Diff in Means

0.697

0.210

0.977

0.717

0.093

0.738

0.842

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
“Housewife” includes housewives, househusbands, and those raising children. “Unemployed” includes self-identified unemployed
and those who list job as “none”. “Agriculture” includes agriculturalists, farmers, daysmen, and cattlemen. “Service” includes
clothiers, sellers, drivers, personal assistants, bakers, caretakers, postal workers, teachers, city hall workers, freelancers, poets,
partners, administrators, athletes, interior designers, postal workers, clerks, librarians, treasurers, and one economist. “Blue
collar” includes those in construction, “workers,” technicians, plumbers, car washers, mechanics, steel workers, security agents,
and chambermaids. Four participants listed jobs we could not classify.

The theory laid out in Section 4 is based on cultural transmission. In particular, Prediction 3 indicates
that outgroup trust should be different for those whose grandparents are from the village than for those
whose grandparents are not. This argument is based on cultural transmission, not some other demographic
detail that might differ between the two groups. Take, for instance, education or religion. It is possible that
the centuries-old institutional differences noted in previous sections affect one’s education or religion in the
present, and it is education or religion in the present that affects trust, not “culture” (as in Alesina and la
Ferrara 2002). In other words, what we are ascribing to culture may actually be mediated through some
other educational or demographic feature. To address this possibility, we report in Table 4 the demographic
summary statistics broken down by whether or not one’s grandparents are from the village. The reported
p-values are intra-village comparisons between those whose grandparents are and are not from the village.
These results suggest that, within villages, participants whose grandparents are from the village are statistically similar to those whose grandparents are not from the village. This indicates that any results we find
are unlikely to arise from mediation via some other channel. The one difference of potential concern is that
participants from (non-Austrian) Ştirbăt whose grandparents are from Ştirbăt have higher education than
those whose grandparents are not from Ştirbăt. This, however, should work against our hypotheses, which
suggest that participants of Ştirbăt should be less trusting of outsiders. The standard result in the literature
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(Alesina and la Ferrara 2002) is that more education leads to greater trust, thus biasing against us finding
lower trust in Ştirbăt.
Table 4: Demographic Summary Statistics, by History in Village

Female
Grandparents
from Village?

Yes

No

Age
Yes

Married
No

Yes

No

High School
or Above
Yes

No

Eastern
Orthodox
Yes

No

Austrian
(Udeşti and Poieni)
N
p-value: Diff in Means

0.55
0.58
(0.05) (0.05)
112
119
0.688

46.85 45.28
(1.76) (1.60)
107
109
0.521

0.57
0.66
(0.05) (0.04)
111
119
0.134

0.53
0.57
(0.05) (0.05)
109
118
0.590

0.90
0.86
(0.03) (0.03)
111
118
0.300

Non-Austrian
(Ştirbăt)
N
p-value: Diff in Means

0.56
0.58
(0.10) (0.08)
27
43
0.833

36.72 43.65
(3.79) (3.07)
25
43
0.169

0.44
0.51
(0.10) (0.08)
27
43
0.587

0.63
0.35
(0.09) (0.07)
27
43
0.023*

1.00
0.93
(0.00) (0.04)
27
43
0.164

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values are within village differences, taken from Wilcoxon
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.

Finally, we examine the degree to which participants trust others. The results are summarized in Table
5. We asked participants to rate how much they trust people in each of the three villages (from 1-5, with
1 being extremely untrustworthy and 5 being extremely trustworthy; see Appendix B.4 for details).24 Not
surprisingly, participants tended to find people from their own village more trustworthy. Participants from
both Austrian Udeşti and Poieni view people from non-Austrian Ştirbăt as less trustworthy than their covillagers while participants from Ştirbăt viewed their co-villagers as more trustworthy than people from
Udeşti and Poieni.25 Yet, participants from the treated and control villages found their co-villagers about
equally trustworthy (3.73 vs. 3.74) while also finding people from the opposite side of the old border equally
(less) trustworthy.26 Within the treated group, it appears that participants from (Austrian) Udeşti and
24 We

asked more questions in the survey about trust in others and unofficial payments (i.e., bribes) one has to make to secure a
variety of public goods. The results, reported in Appendix Table A1, suggest that 2/3 of subjects felt they could trust others,
and few regularly had to pay bribes. Although there are no statistically significant differences in trust between the treatment
and control villages, the question does not ask about in-group vs. out-group, but about trust in general. We also asked questions
about participants’ financial history (i.e., borrowing and lending). The averages are reported in Appendix Table A2. The only
statistically significant finding is that participants from Ştirbăt borrowed and lent more frequently to co-villagers than those
from the treated villages.
25 In the remainder of the paper, including Table 5, we use the term “outsider” simply to refer to those that live within the Udeşti
commune but not within one’s village. Our experiment does not permit us to test participants’ trust of outsiders in general.
26 In Appendix Table A3, we report the fraction of participants who answered each quiz question correctly as well as their average
earnings from the experiment. These results are mixed. Participants from Ştirbăt correctly answered questions 1 and 2 more
often than those from the Austrian villages, but the latter correctly answered questions 5 and 6 more frequently than the
former. In general, participants from all three villages answered nearly 2/3 of questions correctly on average. Although some
participants did not do well on the quiz, we did not impose a threshold for playing. We do, however, control for their quiz score
in the empirical analysis. Participants from Udeşti only played four rounds of the experiment, versus six rounds for participants
from Poieni and Ştirbăt, and thus their earnings are not directly comparable. Participants in Poieni and Ştirbăt earned nearly
the same amount ($18.21 vs. $18.34).
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Poieni trust each other approximately the same, while trusting people from (non-Austrian) Ştirbăt less.27
This suggests the possibility that people on the opposite sides of the old border still consider each other
“outsiders”. However, it is important to note that these are the results of a non-incentivized survey, taken
after participants played a variety of trust games. Hence, their responses may be affected by the game itself
or their expectations of what the experimenters desired (given that they just played a trust game). We
therefore focus on the incentivized trust games in the remainder of the analysis.
Table 5: Summary Statistics, Trust Others
Trust
Co-villagers (1-5)

Trust
Udeşti (1-5)

Trust
Poieni (1-5)

Trust
Ştirbăt (1-5)

Austrian
(Udeşti and Poieni)

3.73
(0.06)
N = 280

3.74
(0.05)
N = 281

3.71
(0.06)
N = 284

3.48
(0.06)
N = 281

Non-Austrian
(Ştirbăt)

3.74
(0.11)
N = 94

3.54
(0.10)
N = 93

3.53
(0.11)
N = 94

3.74
(0.11)
N = 94

0.595

0.068

0.121

0.002**

Side of Border

p-value: Diff in Means

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.

5.2

Trust: The Send Decision

Prediction 1 indicates that participants from the control village (non-Austrian) Ştirbăt will send less tokens
than participants from the treated, Austrian villages (Udeşti and Poieni) when matched with outsiders.
Meanwhile, Prediction 2 indicates that the difference in the amount sent to one’s co-villagers versus outsiders should be greater in the control village (Ştirbăt) than in the treated, Austrian villages. Moreover, if
intra-family, vertical cultural transmission is among the mechanisms connecting historically-derived cultural
differences with contemporary trust norms, we expect these effects to be stronger for participants whose
grandparents lived in their village (Prediction 3).28 Table 6 and Figure 5 report the results.
Figure 5 shows the average amount sent to one’s co-villagers (column 1), sent to outsiders (column 2),
and the fraction of participants who sent more to their co-villagers than to outsiders (column 3). The second
and third rows break down these results by whether one’s grandparents are from the village or not.29 While
27 The

average trust of people from Poieni by participants from Udeşti is 3.66 while the average trust of people from Udeşti by
participants from Poieni is 3.76.
28 Appendix Table A5 provides the same information as Panel A of Table 6, but with the data broken down by whether one’s
great-grandparents are from the village or not. Results are similar to those reported in Table 6.
29 The incentivized results reported in Table 6 show similar patterns to the self-reported levels of trust (see Table 5) when
broken down by whether or not the participant’s grandparent is from the village, although the inter-village differences are not
statistically significant. These results are available upon request.
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breaking down results by family lineage does reduce the size of the samples, it comes with the benefit of
permitting a test of Prediction 3, even if this test is somewhat underpowered.30
Figure 5: Average Amount Sent to Co-villagers and Outsiders
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Consider first Prediction 1, which appears contradicted by the amount sent by all participants in the
treated vs. control groups. The average amount sent to outsiders in the treated (Austrian) villages (1.86) is
similar to the amount sent to outsiders in the control (non-Austrian) village (1.85; p = 0.796). However, participants from Ştirbăt whose grandparents are from Ştirbăt send much less to outsiders than do participants
from the treated villages whose grandparents are from the village (1.94 vs. 1.48; p = 0.007). Meanwhile,
30 Unfortunately,

the issue of the tests being underpowered is a reflection of just how small these villages are. In Ştirbăt and
Poieni, around 1/3 of all households in the village participated in our experiment, while in Udeşti, around 1/5 of households
participated. Thus, slicing the sample along any dimension creates a danger of an underpowered test. This lack of power is
exacerbated when the treated villages are unpooled. Nonetheless, we report these results in Appendix Table A4. In terms of
statistical significance, these results are broadly similar to those reported in Table 6.
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Table 6: Average Amount Sent to Co-villagers and Outsiders

Austrian
(Udeşti and Poieni)
N

Sent More to
Sent to Co-villagers
Sent to Outsiders
Co-villagers (0/1)
Grandparents
Grandparents
Grandparents
from Village?
from Village?
from Village?
All
Yes
No
All
Yes
No
All
Yes
No
A. Treated (Austrian) vs. Control (Non-Austrian)
1.99
2.06
1.94
1.86
1.94
1.83
0.32
0.35
0.30
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04)
(0.07)
(0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
298
111
118
294
108
118
292
107
117

Non-Austrian
(Ştirbăt)
N

2.16
(0.08)
100

2.04
(0.16)
27

2.30
(0.11)
43

1.85
(0.08)
100

1.98
(0.13)
43

0.43
(0.05)
100

0.59
(0.10)
27

0.44
(0.08)
43

p-value: Diff in Means

0.079

0.842

0.013*

0.044*

0.020*

0.092

Austrian
(Poieni)
N

2.04
(0.09)
100

2.19
(0.15)
37

1.94
(0.12)
48

0.796 0.007** 0.317
B. Small Villages
1.67
1.72
1.71
(0.09)
(0.15)
(0.12)
99
36
48

0.43
(0.05)
99

0.44
(0.08)
36

0.40
(0.07)
48

Non-Austrian
(Ştirbăt)
N

2.16
(0.08)
100

2.04
(0.16)
27

2.30
(0.11)
43

1.55
(0.09)
100

1.56
(0.12)
43

0.51
(0.05)
100

0.52
(0.10)
27

0.56
(0.08)
43

p-value: Diff in Means

0.392

0.400

0.036*

0.286

0.563

0.124

Austrian
(Udeşti)
N

1.97
(0.05)
198

2.00
(0.09)
74

1.94
(0.10)
70

0.322
0.100
0.335
C. Treated Villages
1.91
2.03
1.86
(0.05)
(0.09)
(0.09)
195
72
70

0.31
(0.03)
193

0.30
(0.05)
71

0.30
(0.06)
69

Austrian
(Poieni)
N

2.04
(0.09)
100

2.19
(0.15)
37

1.94
(0.12)
48

1.76
(0.08)
99

1.75
(0.13)
36

1.79
(0.10)
48

0.34
(0.05)
99

0.44
(0.08)
36

0.29
(0.07)
48

p-value: Diff in Means

0.380

0.145

0.947

0.199

0.089

0.785

0.513

0.128

0.883

1.48
(0.14)
27

1.33
(0.20)
27

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. Sent
More to Co-villagers = 1 if participant sent more to co-villagers than to outsiders. In the panels A and C, outsiders are defined
as the other village one played with in the first four rounds. In panel B, outsiders are defined as the other village one played
with in the final two rounds.
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there is no statistically significant difference in the amount sent to outsiders across villages among participants whose grandparents are not from the village (1.83 vs. 1.98; p = 0.317). In fact, within this group the
average amount sent is larger for participants from (non-Austrian) Ştirbăt.
One confounding factor in our analysis is that one of the villages in the treated group, Udeşti, is larger
than the other two villages (1,100 househoulds vs. around 300 households in the other two villages). We
address this issue in panel B of Table 6, which compares only the two smallest villages, Poieni and Ştirbăt.
While this comparison lacks power, the results with respect to the amount sent to outsiders is similar to
those reported in panel A. Comparing the final two rounds of play (in which participants from Ştirbăt played
with those from Poieni and vice versa), we find that participants from the two villages send a similar amount
to outsiders (1.67 vs. 1.55; p = 0.322). However, among those with a grandparent from the village, those
from the control village (Ştirbăt) send much less than those from the treated village (1.72 vs. 1.33; p =
0.100).
Finally, in panel C of Table 6, we compare the two treated villages. According to Prediction 1, we should
not see differences in sending behavior across these villages. Indeed, with respect to the amount sent to
outsiders, this is broadly what we find (1.91 vs. 1.76; p = 0.199). While there does appear to be a difference
among those whose grandparents are from the village (2.03 vs. 1.75; p = 0.089), these amounts remain much
larger than in the control village (1.48).
Hence, after accounting for family ties within the village, the experiment results lend support to Predictions 1 and 3. We summarize these results as follows:
Result 1: Participants from the control village (Ştirbăt) whose grandparents are from Ştirbăt send less
when playing with outsiders than do participants from the treated (Austrian) villages whose
grandparents are from the village.
Prediction 2 states that the amount sent to one’s co-villagers relative to the amount sent to outsiders
should be greater in the control village (non-Austrian Ştirbăt) than in the treated, Austrian villages. To
test this prediction, the third column of Figure 5 reports the fraction of participants who sent more to
co-villagers than to outsiders.31 As suggested by Prediction 2, a greater fraction of participants from the
control (non-Austrian) village send more to their co-villagers than participants from the treated (Austrian)
villages (0.32 vs. 0.43; p = 0.044). This is true whether or not one’s grandparents are from the village,
although for different reasons. Among participants whose grandparents are not from the village, those from
(non-Austrian) Ştirbăt send much more to their co-villagers than do those from the treated villages (1.94
31 We

also analyzed the difference in the total amount sent to co-villagers and outsiders. All results are similar in terms of
statistical significance to the results pertaining to the fraction of participants who sent more to co-villagers than to outsiders.
For the sake of brevity we do not include these statistics.
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vs. 2.30; p = 0.013). We will return to this observation shortly. Meanwhile, among participants whose
grandparents are from the village, Result 1 noted that those from Ştirbăt send much less to outsiders than
do those from the two treated villages. These results are summarized as follows:
Result 2: Participants from the control village (Ştirbăt) are more likely to send more to their co-villagers
than to outsiders than participants from the treated (Austrian) villages.
Finally, we address a possible explanation for the finding that, among participants whose grandparents
are not from the village, those from the control village (non-Austrian Ştirbăt) send more to their co-villagers
than do those from the treated, Austrian villages. One possible explanation is that newcomers selectively
chose the village in which they currently reside. That is, if they chose to live in their current village because
they found people in that village to be particularly trustworthy, they may send more to co-villagers than
those whose families have lived there multiple generations. And, if people from Ştirbăt are indeed particularly
trustworthy, at least with respect to their co-villagers, this selection effect could contribute to our finding.
To address this possibility, we run ordered probit regressions on the amount participants sent to covillagers and outsiders, controlling for numerous individual characteristics.32 We also control for order
effects,33 the participant’s quiz score, and demographic controls including a gender dummy, age, age squared,
marital status, a high school education dummy, an Eastern Orthodox dummy, religiosity, and occupational
status. The results are reported in Table 7.34
The results are broadly consistent with what we find in the comparison of means. There does not
appear to be a “Ştirbăt effect” in the amount sent to outsiders (columns (3)-(4)), although subjects whose
grandparents are from Ştirbăt send significantly less to outsiders (consistent with Result 1). There does
appear to be a “Ştirbăt effect” with respect to the amount sent to co-villagers: the Ştirbăt dummy coefficient
is positive and statistically significant in specification (2). The coefficient on the “Grandparents from Village
* Ştirbăt” interaction term indicates that this effect may be driven by subjects whose grandparents are not
from the village, although this coefficient is not statistically significant. In other words, while we find a
“Ştirbăt effect”—participants from Ştirbăt send more to their co-villagers than do those from the treated
villages—we cannot say with statistical precision that this effect is confined to those who do or do not have
a grandparent from the village.
These results raise the question: why is there a “Ştirbăt effect” in the amount sent to one’s co-villagers
that transcends one’s family’s ties to the village? Such an effect would be consistent with people from Ştirbăt
32 Linear

probability model estimates are similar in terms of statistical significance. These results are available upon request.
order of game play is statistically significant in many of the specifications, consistent with decay found in repeated economic
experiments.
34 In Appendix Table A6 we include potentially endogenous regressors, i.e., those related to trust. Results are broadly similar
to the ones reported in Table 7. There is a reduced sample size in Table 7 because not all participants knew whether their
grandparents came from the village, and a few participants failed to answer the survey question.
33 The
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Table 7: Ordered Probit Regressions: Average Amount Sent to Co-villagers and Outsiders

Dependent Variable:
Ştirbăt Dummy

(1)
(2)
Sent to Co-villagers

(3)
(4)
Sent to Outsiders

0.26
(0.15)

0.10
(0.15)

-0.26
(0.13)
0.15
(0.16)

0.44*
(0.22)
0.11
(0.16)
-0.45
(0.34)
-0.13
(0.15)
0.11
(0.17)

-0.51**
(0.13)
0.02
(0.15)

0.33
(0.21)
0.12
(0.16)
-0.91**
(0.34)
-0.38*
(0.15)
0.03
(0.17)

N
Pseudo R-squared

336
0.03

264
0.03

332
0.04

260
0.05

QUIZ SCORE
DEMOGRAPHIC

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

Grandparents from
Village Dummy
Grandparents from
Village * Ştirbăt
Order: Own First
Know Someone
From Other Village

Notes: Ordered probit coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. Quiz Score is number
correct out of 6 on incentivized quiz. Demographic characteristics are a gender dummy, age, age squared, married dummy, high
school education dummy, Eastern Orthodox dummy, dummy for whether subjects attend religious services, and dummies for
occupation type (not employed, blue collar, agriculture, service, and other). Outsiders are defined as the outside village one
played with in the first four rounds.

being more trustworthy; i.e., more likely to return tokens to their co-villagers. We address this question in
the following section by analyzing the participants’ return decisions.

5.3

Trustworthiness: The Return Decision

In Section 4, we made no predictions regarding the return decision. Yet, these results may shed light on
the “Ştirbăt effect” from Result 2, namely that participants from (non-Austrian) Ştirbăt send more to their
co-villagers than do those from the treated, Austrian villages regardless of their family history in the village.
If people from Ştirbăt are indeed more trustworthy (i.e., they return more conditional on the amount sent),
their fellow villagers could know this and accordingly send more to their co-villagers, regardless of how long
their family lived in the village. Such a choice would be rational “statistical discrimination,” as discussed in
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001).
To this end, we analyze the amount returned to co-villagers and outsiders conditional on the sender
they were matched with sending 1, 2, or 3 tokens. The results are summarized in Table 8 and Figure
6.35 These results indicate that rational, statistical discrimination can explain at least part of the “Ştirbăt
35 Appendix

Table A7 provides the same information as Table 8, but with the data broken down by whether one’s great-
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effect”. Participants from Ştirbăt returned more to co-villagers than those from the treated, Austrian villages
conditional on being sent 2 tokens (3.36 vs. 3.65; p = 0.052) and conditional on being sent 3 tokens (4.82
vs. 5.26; p = 0.128). Although statistically imprecise, this indicates that it is rational for participants from
Ştirbăt to send more to their co-villagers.
Table 8: Average Amount Returned to Co-villagers and Outsiders

Austrian
(Udeşti and Poieni)
N

2.00
(0.04)
297

1.87
(0.08)
110

If Sent 2
If Sent 3
Grandparents
Grandparents
from Village?
from Village?
All
Yes
No
All
Yes
No
Returned to Co-villagers
2.08
3.36
3.30
3.43
4.82
4.90
4.91
(0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.21)
119
295
109
119
292
108
118

Non-Austrian
(Ştirbăt)
N

2.00
(0.08)
99

1.96
(0.16)
27

2.05
(0.10)
43

3.65
(0.16)
98

3.60
(0.25)
42

5.26
(0.24)
99

4.85
(0.49)
27

5.28
(0.32)
43

p-value: Diff in Means

0.964

0.661

0.710

0.128

0.813

0.342

Austrian
(Udeşti and Poieni)
N

1.78
(0.04)
298

1.80
(0.07)
111

1.76
(0.07)
118

0.052 0.627 0.436
Returned to Outsiders
3.24
3.17
3.30
(0.08) (0.14) (0.14)
297
110
118

4.71
(0.13)
294

4.67
(0.20)
108

4.81
(0.21)
118

Non-Austrian
(Ştirbăt)
N

1.92
(0.09)
96

1.69
(0.15)
26

1.90
(0.13)
41

3.52
(0.16)
97

2.92
(0.30)
26

3.62
(0.25)
42

5.26
(0.26)
97

4.19
(0.50)
27

5.22
(0.37)
41

p-value: Diff in Means

0.117

0.445

0.295

0.130

0.345

0.261

0.047*

0.345

0.357

All

If Sent 1
Grandparents
from Village?
Yes
No

3.48
(0.36)
27

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.

Likewise, trustworthiness may provide an explanation for why people whose grandparents are from nonAustrian Ştirbăt send less to outsiders than people whose grandparents are from the treated, Austrian villages
(Result 1). The average amounts returned to outsiders conditional on the amount sent are summarized in
the bottom panel of Table 8. The results indicate that participants from Ştirbăt do indeed return more to
outsiders than those from the treated villages conditional on being sent 2 tokens (3.24 vs. 3.52; p = 0.130)
and conditional on being sent 3 tokens (4.71 vs. 5.26; p = 0.047). However, these results are not driven
by participants whose grandparents are from the village. There is no statistically significant difference in
the amount returned between the two villages among participants whose grandparents are from the village;
if anything, those from Ştirbăt return less. Moreover, within Ştirbăt, participants whose grandparents are
from the village return less than those whose grandparents are not from the village conditional on being sent
grandparents are from the village or not. Results are similar to those reported in Table 8
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Figure 6: Average Amount Returned to Co-villagers and Outsiders
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2 tokens (2.92 vs. 3.62; p = 0.052) or 3 tokens (4.19 vs. 5.22; p = 0.111). Meanwhile, within the treated
villages, participants whose grandparents are from the village return a statistically indistinguishable amount
from those whose grandparents are not from the village conditional on being sent 2 tokens (3.17 vs. 3.30; p
= 0.320) or 3 tokens (4.67 vs. 4.81; p = 0.622).
These results make it difficult to reconcile Result 1 with a purely “statistical discrimination” viewpoint.
Such an explanation would require participants whose grandparents are from the treated, Austrian villages
believing that outsiders will return more than those whose grandparents are from the control village. Even
though this is correct, this result is driven by participants whose grandparents are not from the village in
question. Hence, while it is possible that the presence of statistical discrimination is a reflection of cultural
differences generated by the old Austrian border, the most likely explanation for Result 1 remains that
outgroup trust—rational or not—is weaker on the non-Austrian side of the border. These findings are
summarized as follows:
Result 4: Participants in the treated (Austrian) villages return less to both co-villagers and outsiders than
do those from the control (non-Austrian) village. There are no statistically significant differences
in the amount returned between the treated and control villages when the sample is split between
those whose grandparents are and are not from the village.
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6

Conclusion

This paper takes advantage of a natural experiment to shed light on whether norms derived from historical
circumstances persist in the long run. We run a “lab in the field” trust game experiment in three villages
in northeastern Romania, which were on opposite sides of the old Austrian border for over a century for
arbitrary, idiosyncratic reasons. The arbitrariness of the border placement in combination with the wellknown differences in Austrian and Ottoman/Russian institutions and centuries-old migration patterns makes
this an ideal environment to test whether cultural norms that arose due to historical reasons persist in the long
run. Ottoman and Russian administrative institutions were famously rapacious and harmful to commerce,
and the literature suggests this eroded trust in government in the former Ottoman/Russian lands. Meanwhile,
villages “treated” with the relatively efficient and corruption-free Austrian administration were potentially
motivated to trust outsiders—all three empires were outsiders to Romanians. We hypothesize that these
historical differences should have fostered the emergence of different trust norms in the two regions, with
people on the “treated” Austrian side of the border being more trusting of outsiders. We further hypothesize
that, if trust norms are indeed passed on inter-generationally (i.e., vertically), these inter-village differences
should be most apparent among participants whose grandparents are from the village. Their grandparents
would have lived, or lived with people who lived, while the border differences existed, and thus possibly
would have been imbued with these cultural attributes at an early age.
Our results confirm most of these hypotheses. Most strikingly, when participants played the game with
outsiders, there was no difference between the treated and control villages in the amount sent. However,
focusing on the overall average masks significant heterogeneity within the village: while there were no
differences in the amount sent by people whose grandparents were not from their home village, people whose
grandparents grew up in the village on the treated (Austrian) side sent significantly more to outsiders than
people whose grandparents grew up in the control (non-Austrian) side.
While these results permit alternative hypotheses—perhaps people whose grandparents are from this
one village in northeastern Romania are just less trusting of outsiders for some idiosyncratic reason besides
cultural transmission—our methodology and the complementary literature suggest that these results are
indeed reflective of the cultural transmission of norms established over a century ago. First, we chose to
run the experiments in three small villages in which we had ex ante hypotheses for how participants in the
village would act. These hypotheses are largely confirmed by the experiments. Second, the experiment was
run double-blind, so the experimenters could not subconsciously affect the outcomes in favor of the proposed
hypotheses. Third, the results supported the sub-hypotheses that the differences would largely arise from
participants whose grandparents were from the villages (admittedly, we were surprised by how strong these
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findings were). Fourth, these findings are consistent with a larger literature suggesting that Austrian and
Ottoman/Russian institutions had long run, still present effects on trust.
These results have implications for the role that culture can play in affecting economic outcomes and
vice versa. By identifying a cultural attribute that arguably has economic and institutional antecedents, we
avoid conflating the direction of causality. We also show that once a trait becomes imbued in a society’s (or,
in our case, village’s) culture, it can remain in spite of economic and political changes which entail that the
cultural trait is not necessarily a best response. Although we do not wish to push results from an experiment
in one Romanian commune too far, this insight has broad implications for the role that culture plays in the
evolution—or lack thereof—of economic and political institutions (also see Bisin and Verdier 2017, Iyigun
and Rubin 2017). If culture is indeed as “sticky” as our results suggest, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
understand the role of institutions on decision-making unless one also understands how a society’s culture
(and, possibly, its historical antecedents) interacts with institutions to incentivize behavior.
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Appendix: Extra Tables and Robustness Checks
FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION

Table A1: Summary Statistics, General Trust in Others and Public Goods

Can People
be Trusted

Can People
be Trusted
(prior to
1989)

Unofficial
Payment
to Police

Unofficial
Payment
for Official
Documents

Unofficial
Payment for
Education

Unofficial
Payment for
Medical

Austrian
(Udeşti and Poieni)

0.65
(0.03)
N = 267

0.81
(0.03)
N = 244

0.13
(0.02)
N = 269

0.18
(0.02)
N = 272

0.24
(0.03)
N = 270

0.41
(0.03)
N = 274

Non-Austrian
(Ştirbăt)

0.66
(0.05)
N = 89

0.81
(0.05)
N = 70

0.13
(0.03)
N = 95

0.16
(0.04)
N = 92

0.19
(0.04)
N = 89

0.38
(0.05)
N = 94

0.847

0.897

0.998

0.769

0.301

0.616

Side of Border

p-value: Diff in Means

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. All
variables take value of 1 if subject answered 3, 4, or 5 on 5 point scale.

Table A2: Summary Statistics, Personal Finance
Have a Bank
Account

Borrowed from
a Co-Villager

Lent to a
Co-Villager

Borrowed from
an Outsider

Lent to
an Outsider

Austrian
(Udeşti and Poieni)

0.25
(0.03)
N = 291

0.56
(0.03)
N = 289

0.67
(0.03)
N = 295

0.31
(0.03)
N = 293

0.38
(0.03)
N = 290

Non-Austrian
(Ştirbăt)

0.28
(0.05)
N = 92

0.71
(0.05)
N = 97

0.77
(0.04)
N = 98

0.38
(0.05)
N = 99

0.46
(0.05)
N = 97

0.545

0.009**

0.070

0.203

0.159

Side of Border

p-value: Diff in Means

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
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Table A3: Summary Statistics, Experiment Results
Side of Border

Question 1

Question 2

Question 3

Question 4

Question 5

Question 6

Austrian
(Udeşti and Poieni)

0.95
(0.01)
N = 296

0.82
(0.02)
N = 291

0.62
(0.03)
N = 285

0.77
(0.02)
N = 284

0.64
(0.03)
N = 277

0.68
(0.03)
N = 270

Non-Austrian
(Ştirbăt)

0.99
(0.01)
N = 97

0.95
(0.02)
N = 95

0.55
(0.05)
N = 95

0.82
(0.04)
N = 93

0.28
(0.05)
N = 92

0.44
(0.05)
N = 86

0.099

0.003**

0.227

0.351

0.000**

0.001**

Udeşti

Poieni

Ştirbăt

13.49
(0.21)
N = 200

18.21
(0.35)
N = 100

18.34
(0.35)
N = 100

p-value: Diff in Means

Total Earnings (USD)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
Earnings are lower in Udeşti (in part) because participants played two fewer rounds. p-value of difference in means between
earnings in Poieni and Ştirbăt is 0.633. Earnings were paid in Romanian leu. The exchange rate at the time of the experiment
was 4 leu: 1 USD.

Table A4: Average Amount Sent to Co-villagers and Outsiders, Treated data unpooled

Sent to Co-villagers
Grandparents
from Village?
All
Yes
No

Sent to Outsiders
Grandparents
from Village?
All
Yes
No

Sent More to
Co-villagers (0/1)
Grandparents
from Village?
All
Yes
No

Udeşti
(Austrian)
N

1.97
(0.05)
198

2.00
(0.09)
74

1.94
(0.10)
70

1.91
(0.05)
195

2.03
(0.09)
72

1.86
(0.09)
70

0.31
(0.03)
193

0.30
(0.05)
71

0.30
(0.06)
69

Poieni
(Austrian)
N

2.04
(0.09)
100

2.19
(0.15)
37

1.94
(0.12)
48

1.76
(0.08)
99

1.75
(0.13)
36

1.79
(0.10)
48

0.34
(0.05)
99

0.44
(0.08)
36

0.29
(0.07)
48

Ştirbăt
(non-Austrian)
N

2.16
(0.08)
100

2.04
(0.16)
27

2.30
(0.11)
43

1.85
(0.08)
100

1.48
(0.14)
27

1.98
(0.13)
43

0.43
(0.05)
100

0.59
(0.10)
27

0.44
(0.08)
43

Udeşti vs. Ştirbăt
Poieni vs. Ştirbăt
Udeşti vs. Poieni

0.046*
0.392
0.380

0.851
0.400
0.145

p-values: Difference in Means
0.023* 0.509 0.002** 0.440
0.036* 0.611
0.141
0.302
0.947
0.199
0.089
0.785

0.035*
0.211
0.513

0.007**
0.248
0.128

0.141
0.139
0.883

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. Sent
More to Home Village = 1 if participant sent more to co-villagers than to outsiders. Outsiders are defined as the other village
the participant played with in first four rounds.
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Table A5: Average Amount Sent to Co-villagers and Outsiders, Participants whose Great-Grandparents are
and are not from the Village
Sent to Co-villagers
Great-Grandparents
from Village?
Yes
No

Sent to Outsiders
Great-Grandparents
from Village?
Yes
No

Austrian
(Udeşti and Poieni)

2.09
(0.09)
N = 87

1.94
(0.07)
N = 142

1.96
(0.08)
N = 83

1.83
(0.06)
N = 143

Non-Austrian
(Ştirbăt)

1.95
(0.18)
N = 22

2.31
(0.11)
N = 48

1.50
(0.16)
N = 22

1.92
(0.12)
N = 48

0.443

0.008**

0.008**

0.497

p-value: Diff in Means

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
Outsiders are defined as the other village the participant played with in first four rounds

Table A6: Ordered Probit Regressions: Average Amount Sent to Co-villagers and Outsiders, with potentially
endogenous regressors

Dependent Variable:
Ştirbăt Dummy

(1)
(2)
Sent to Co-villagers

(3)
(4)
Sent to Outsiders

0.31
(0.16)

0.08
(0.16)

-0.16
(0.15)
0.21
(0.17)

0.56*
(0.23)
0.04
(0.17)
-0.49
(0.38)
-0.10
(0.17)
0.14
(0.19)

-0.46**
(0.15)
0.05
(0.17)

0.28
(0.23)
0.01
(0.17)
-0.74*
(0.37)
-0.33
(0.17)
0.09
(0.18)

N
Pseudo R-squared

293
0.05

237
0.06

289
0.05

233
0.05

QUIZ SCORE
DEMOGRAPHIC
FINANCE
PAY FOR SERVICE

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

Grandparents from
Village Dummy
Grandparents from
Village * Ştirbăt
Order: Own First
Know Someone
From Other Village

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. Quiz Score is number correct out of 6 on incentivized quiz.
Demographic characteristics are a gender dummy, age, age squared, married dummy, high school education dummy, Eastern
Orthodox dummy, dummy for whether subjects attend religious services, and dummies for occupation type (not employed, blue
collar, agriculture, service, and other). Finance includes dummies for whether one has borrowed and lent to co-villagers and
outsiders. Pay for Service is an answer (1-5) regarding how often one has to pay bribes to police, for official documents, to
receive public education, and to receive medical treatment.

39

Table A7: Average Amount Returned to Co-villagers and Outsiders, Participants whose Great-Grandparents
are and are not from the Village

Austrian
(Udeşti and Poieni)
N

If Sent 1
If Sent 2
If Sent 3
Great-Grandparents from Village?
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Returned to Co-villagers
1.87
2.05
3.29
3.41
4.92
4.89
(0.09) (0.06) (0.16) (0.11) (0.26) (0.19)
86
143
85
143
85
141

Non-Austrian
(Ştirbăt)
N

2.00
(0.17)
22

2.02
(0.10)
48

p-value: Diff in Means

0.547

Austrian
(Udeşti and Poieni)
N

3.55
(0.41)
22

3.55
(0.23)
47

5.18
(0.56)
22

5.08
(0.31)
48

0.471 0.726
Outsiders
3.30
4.61
(0.12) (0.23)
142
85

0.604

1.78
(0.08)
87

0.742 0.518
Returned to
1.78
3.13
(0.06) (0.15)
142
86

4.82
(0.19)
141

Non-Austrian
(Ştirbăt)
N

1.67
(0.17)
21

1.89
(0.12)
46

3.00
(0.32)
21

3.51
(0.25)
47

4.18
(0.53)
22

5.11
(0.36)
46

p-value: Diff in Means

0.466

0.376

0.512

0.378

0.421

0.440

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
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B

Appendix: Sample Instructions (in English)36
FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION

B.1

Instructions: Send Decision

This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making conducted by Cult Research on behalf of researchers in the USA. The instructions are simple.
You will receive 10 lei simply for participating in the experiment. If you follow the instructions carefully, you
have the potential to earn a significant amount more. A Cult Research employee will collect your decisions
from the experiment, and a different Cult Research employee will calculate how much you earned during
the experiment. In one week, the Cult Research employee will return and pay you the amount you earned
during the experiment. Please note that if you talk to others during the experiment or exclaim out loud,
you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid.
There are 200 participants taking place in the experiment from Udeşti. You will not be told the names of
the other participants and they will not be told your name. All participants have identical instructions.
The Decision Situation
You will begin the experiment with 3 tokens. Each token is equivalent to 3 lei, meaning that you start the
experiment with 9 total lei.
You will be partnered with another participant from Udeşti. You will not know who you are partnered with
when you make your decisions, and you will not find out who you were partnered with after the experiment
is over. We will call this person your “partner” for the remainder of these instructions.
Your Decision
The Cult Research employee will give you a handout after the instructions are read. At the top of the
handout are numbers from 0 to 3.
You will circle one—and only one—of these numbers. The number you circle is the amount of your 3 tokens
you will send to the participant from Udeşti with whom you are matched. You can choose any number you
like, but you can only choose one number. You will keep any tokens you do not send to your partner.
Transferring Tokens to Your Partner
Your partner will receive 3 times the number of tokens you circled on your handout.
For example, if you choose 2 tokens, your partner will receive 6 tokens. If you choose 0 tokens, your partner
will receive 0 tokens. If you choose 3 tokens, your partner will receive 9 tokens.
The following table indicates how many tokens your partner receives for each possible amount you might
circle.

36 These

instructions were the ones given to the participants in Udeşti when they played with other participants in Udeşti (in the
order in which one played against their own village first). Instructions for the other villages were exactly the same, with only
the names of the villages changed. Instructions for later rounds were similar but abbreviated.
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Amount you
circle
0
1
2
3

Your partner
receives
0
3
6
9

Your Partner’s Decision

Your partner will have the opportunity to return all, some, or none of the tokens you send them. They can
choose to return to you anywhere between 0 tokens and the number of tokens they receive.
For example, if you choose to send your partner 2 tokens, your partner will receive 6 tokens. This means
that they can choose to return to you 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 tokens.
For another example, if you choose to send your partner 1 token, your partner will receive 3 tokens. This
means that they can choose to return to you 0, 1, 2, or 3 tokens.
Your partner will not know how many tokens you sent them when they make their decision. Instead, they
will fill out the following table. This table indicates how many tokens they will return to you for each possible
number of tokens they received. Your partner will circle one number in each of the lower 3 boxes. We have
circled the 0 in the first box, because if you send zero, your partner has no choice but to return 0 to you.

If your
You
partner sends receive
Circle a number to return to your partner
0
0
0
1

3

0

1

2

3

2

6

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

3

9

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

End of the Experiment

After the experiment is over, we will look at how many tokens you sent to your partner. We will take
that amount and see what your partner says he/she would return to you should you send the amount you
indicated.
For example, say you choose to send 2 tokens to your partner. This is multiplied by 3, so your partner has
6 tokens. We then look to see how many tokens your partner chooses to return to you when you chose to
send him/her 2 tokens.
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You and Your Partner’s Income
You will keep each token you do not send to your partner. Your will also keep all tokens that your partner
returns to you. At the end of the experiment, each token will be converted to 3 lei and paid to you in cash
in one week.
Your Total Income = Tokens you do not send to your partner (= 3 tokens – amount you send) + Amount
returned to you by your partner
Your Partner’s Total Income = 3*Tokens you send – amount your partner returns to you
Examples
EXAMPLE 1: Suppose that you decide to send 1 token to your partner. This 1 token is multiplied by
3, meaning that your partner receives 3 tokens. Suppose that in the box next to 1, your partner circles 2,
meaning that she will return 2 tokens to you and keep 1 token. Your total earnings are therefore (3 – 1) +
2 = 4 tokens. Your partner’s earnings are 3 – 2 = 1 token.
EXAMPLE 2: Suppose that you decide to send 3 tokens to your partner. These 3 tokens are multiplied by
3, meaning that your partner receives 9 tokens. Suppose that in the box next to 3, your partner chooses 2,
meaning that she will return 2 tokens to you and keep 7 tokens. Your total earnings are therefore (3 – 3) +
2 = 2 tokens. Your partner’s earnings are 9 – 2 = 7 tokens.
The Cult Research employee will now hand out a short quiz to test your understanding of the experiment.
Playing the Game
You have been randomly matched with a participant from Udeşti. You will play this game only once. Please
circle one (and only one) number on the handout that the Cult Research employee will hand to you shortly.
At the end of the experiment, we will convert each of your tokens into 3 lei.

B.2

Instructions: Return Decision

You will now participate in the same experiment you just participated in, except now your role will be
reversed. Like before, there are 200 participants taking place in the experiment from Udeşti. You will not
be told the names of the other participants and they will not be told your name. All participants have
identical instructions. You will not be matched with the same person you were matched with in the previous
experiment. We will briefly refresh you on the decision situation below.
The Decision Situation
You will begin the experiment with 0 tokens. Each token is equivalent to 3 lei, meaning that you start the
experiment with 0 total lei. You will be matched with another participant from Udeşti.
Tokens sent to you by your partner are multiplied by three. You will then be given the opportunity to
return none, some, or all of the tokens your partner sent to you. You will keep any tokens you do not
return to your partner.
Your Decision
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Your partner will circle the amount he/she will send to you. They can circle any number between 0 and 3.
You will receive 3 times the number of tokens your partner circled on his/her handout. You will not know
how many tokens your partner from Udeşti sent to you when you make your decision. Instead, you will
fill out the following table. This table indicates how many tokens you will return to your partner for each
possible number of tokens they sent you. You will circle one number in each of the last 3 boxes. Please note
that we have already circled “0” next to the top box because that is your only option. You do not need to
circle anything in this box.

If your
You
partner sends receive
Circle a number to return to your partner
0
0
0
1

3

0

1

2

3

2

6

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

3

9

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

You and Your Partner’s Income

You will keep each token you do not return to your partner. At the end of the experiment, each token will
be converted to 3 lei and paid to you in cash in one week.
Your Total Income = 3*Tokens your partner sends – amount you return to your partner
Your Partner’s Total Income = Tokens he/she does not send to you (= 3 tokens – amount he/she sends) +
Amount you return to him/her

Playing the Game

You have been randomly matched with a participant from Udeşti. You will play this game only once. Please
circle one (and only one) number in each of the three bottom boxes on the handout that the Cult Research
employee will hand to you shortly (you do not need to circle a number in the first box; we have already
circled 0 for you). At the end of the experiment, we will convert each of your tokens into 3 lei.

B.3

Quiz

The 6 questions below will test your understanding of the experiment. You will be paid 0.75 leu for each
question you answer correctly. You will not be paid for incorrect answers. Please write your answer on the
line provided next to each question. If we cannot read your answers, they will be counted as incorrect.
The Situation: Suppose that you decide to send 2 tokens to your partner by circling the 2 on your handout
as follows:
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Suppose that the participant with whom you are randomly matched (your partner) fills out their handout
as on the following page.
Question 1: How many tokens will your partner return to you?
Question 2: How many total tokens will you earn?
Question 3: How many total tokens will your partner earn?
Now, instead of assuming that you chose to send 2 tokens to your partner, assume that you chose to send
3 tokens. Please answer the following questions, assuming that your partner fills out their handout as on
the following page.
Question 4: How many tokens will your partner return to you?
Question 5: How many total tokens will you earn?
Question 6: How many total tokens will your partner earn?

If your
You
partner sends receive
Circle a number to return to your partner
0
0
0

B.4

1

3

0

1

2

3

2

6

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

3

9

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Survey37

Please fill out this brief survey by circling the answer that most accurately applies. If there is a line next
to a question, please enter your answer on the line. Your entries are confidential: none of the information
in this survey will ever be matched to your name or shared with anybody outside of those conducting the
experiment.
1)

What is your gender?
a.
Male
b.
Female

2)

What is your age?

37 This

sample survey is the one given to participants in Udeşti. Participants in Poieni and Ştirbăt received surveys with different
questions 23, 24, and 25, since they played against participants from both villages. Questions 5-7 were re-worded in Poieni and
Ştirbăt to reflect their home village, while questions 19-22 were re-worded to reflect the other two villages.
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3)

What
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

is your marital status?
Single
Married
Divorced
Widowed
Other

4)

What
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

is the highest level of education you completed?
None, or lower than grade school
Grade school or Middle school
High school
College (undergraduate)
College (graduate)

5)

Have you lived in Udeşti your entire life?
a.
Yes
b.
No

6)

If you answered “No” to Question 5, how long have you lived in Udeşti?

7)

To your knowledge, how long has your family lived in Udeşti?
a.
You moved to Udeşti during your lifetime
b.
Your parents moved to Udeşti
c.
Your grandparents moved to Udeşti
d.
Your great-grandparents or an older generation moved to Udeşti
e.
I don’t know

8)

What is your occupation?

9)

What
a.
b.
c.
d.

10)

How
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

is your religion?
Eastern Orthodox
Roman Catholic
None/non-religious
Other (please list)
often do you attend religious services?
Never
Once or twice a year (or less)
Several times a year
Once a month
2-3 times a month
Weekly
Several times a week

11)
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful
in dealing with people? Please answer on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means that you have complete distrust
in people, and 5 means that most people can be trusted.
a.
What would it be today? (please answer 1 through 5)
b.
And before 1989? (please answer 1 through 5)
12)
In your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/gifts
in these situations? Please answer on a scale from 1 to 5, where the scale is as follows: (Scale: Never=1,
Seldom=2, Sometimes=3, Usually=4, Always=5)
a.
Interact with road police (please answer 1 through 5)
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b.
c.
d.

Dealing with official documents (1 through 5)
Receive public education (1 through 5)
Receive medical treatment (1 through 5)

13)

Do you have a bank account?
a.
Yes
b.
No

14)

Have you ever borrowed money from someone living in Udeşti?
a.
Yes
b.
No

15)

Have you ever lent money to someone living in Udeşti?
a.
Yes
b.
No

16)

Have you ever borrowed money from someone living outside of Udeşti?
a.
Yes
b.
No

17)

Have you ever lent money to someone living outside of Udeşti?
a.
Yes
b.
No

18)

How
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

19)

Do you know anybody from Ştirbăt?
a.
Yes
b.
No

20)

How
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

21)

Do you know anybody from Poieni?
a.
Yes
b.
No

22)

How
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

trustworthy, in general, do you think the people of Udeşti are?
Extremely trustworthy
Somewhat trustworthy
Uncertain
Somewhat untrustworthy
Extremely untrustworthy

trustworthy, in general, do you think the people of Ştirbăt are?
Extremely trustworthy
Somewhat trustworthy
Uncertain
Somewhat untrustworthy
Extremely untrustworthy

trustworthy, in general, do you think the people of Poieni are?
Extremely trustworthy
Somewhat trustworthy
Uncertain
Somewhat untrustworthy
Extremely untrustworthy

23)
Did you make choices differently when your partner was from Udeşti than when they were from
Ştirbăt?
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a.
b.

Yes
No

24)
If you answered “Yes” to Question 23, why did you make your choices differently? Please answer
below, and use as much space as needed.
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C

Appendix: Sample Instructions (in Romanian)38
FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION

C.1

Instructions: Send Decision

Aceasta este un studiu cu caracter economic despre luarea deciziilor. Acesta este condus de Cult Research
din partea cercetătorilor din Statele Unite ale Americii. Instrucţiunile sunt simple.
Veţi primi 10 lei doar pentru simpla participare la experiment. Dacă veţi urmări instrucţiunile cu atenţie,
aveţi posibilitatea să câştigaţi o sumă mai mare de bani. Unul dintre angajaţii Cult Research va colecta
deciziile dumneavoastră cu privire la experiment, iar un alt angajat de la Cult Research va calcula cât de
mult aţi câştigat de-a lungul experimentului. Într-o săptămână, reprezentantul Cult Research se va ı̂ntoarce
şi vă va oferi suma de bani pe care aţi acumulat-o de-a lungul experimentului. Vă rugăm să fiţi atenţi la
faptul că dacă veţi vorbi cu ceilalţi ı̂n timpul experimentului sau dacă vă veţi exprima cu voce tare, veţi fi
rugat să părăsiţi ı̂ncăperea şi nu veţi fi plătit.
Vor fi un număr de participanţi care participă la experiment din localitatea Udeşti. Nu le veţi spune numele
dumneavoastră celorlalţi participanţi la studiu şi ei nu vă vor spune numele lor. Toţi participanţii vor avea
instrucţiuni identice.
Situaţia de decizie
Veţi ı̂ncepe experimentul cu 3 jetoane. Fiecare jeton este echivalent cu 3 lei, acest lucru ı̂nsemnând că veţi
ı̂ncepe experimentul cu un total de 9 lei.
Veţi fi pus ı̂n legătură cu un alt participant din localitatea Udeşti. Nu veţi şti cu cine aţi fost pus ı̂n legătură
atunci când luaţi deciziile şi nici nu veţi şti cu cine aţi fost pun ı̂n legătură odată ce experimentul s-a ı̂ncheiat.
Îi vom spune acestei persoane că este “partenerul” dumneavoastră pentru restul acestor instrucţiuni.
Decizia dumneavoastră
Un angajat Cult Research vă va ı̂nmâna un suport de hârtie după ce instrucţiunile au fost citite. În partea
de sus a acestuia sunt numere de la 0 la 3.
Va trebui să ı̂ncercuiţi unul – şi doar unul - dintre aceste numere. Numărul pe care ı̂l ı̂ncercuiţi reprezintă câte
din cele 3 jetoane pe care le aveţi decideţi să i le trimiteţi participantului din Udeşti cu care dumneavoastră
sunteţi pus ı̂n legătură. Puteţi alege orice număr doriţi, dar să fiţi atenţi să fie doar un singur număr. Veţi
păstra orice jeton pe care nu ı̂l veţi trimite partenerului dumneavoastră.
Transferul de jetoane către partenerul dumneavoastră
Partenerul dumneavoastră va primi de 3 ori mai multe jetoane decât aţi ı̂ncercuit pe suportul de hârtie.
De exemplu, dacă alegeţi 2 jetoane, partenerul dumneavoastră va primi 6 jetoane. Dacă alegeţi 0 jetoane,
partenerul dumneavoastră va primi 0 jetoane. Dacă alegeţi 3 jetoane, partenerul dumneavoastră va primi 9
de jetoane.
Tabelul alăturat indică numărul de jetoane pe care ı̂l poate primi partenerul dumneavoastră pentru fiecare
sumă pe care dumneavoastră o ı̂ncercuiţi.
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Cât primeşte
Cât încercuiţi
partenerul
dumneavoastră dumneavoastră
0
0
1
3
2
6
3
9
Decizia partenerului dumneavoastră
Partenerul dumneavoastră are oportunitatea să returneze tot, o parte sau niciunul dintre jetoanele pe care
dumneavoastră i le-aţi trimis. El are opţiunea să returneze orice număr de jetoane cuprins ı̂ntre zero şi
numărul de jetoane pe care ı̂l primesc.
De exemplu, dacă alegeţi să ı̂i trimiteţi partenerului dumneavoastră 2 jetoane, acesta va primi 6 jetoane.
Acest lucru ı̂nseamnă că el poate alege să vă returneze 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 sau 6 jetoane.
Un alt exemplu: dacă dumneavoastră alegeţi să ı̂i trimiteţi partenerului dumneavoastră 1 jeton, acesta va
primi 3 jetoane. Acest lucru ı̂nseamnă că el poate alege să vă returneze 0, 1, 2 sau 3 jetoane.
Partenerul dumneavoastră nu va şti câte jetoane i-aţi trimis atunci când va lua propria decizie. În schimb,
el va completa tabelul următor. Acest tabel arată câte jetoane vă va returna pentru fiecare număr posibil
de jetoane pe care ı̂l primeşte. Partenerul dumneavoastră va ı̂ncercui un număr ı̂n fiecare din cele 3 căsuţe.
Am ı̂ncercuit noi deja 0 pentru dumneavoastră ı̂n prima căsuţă, deoarece dacă trimiteţi zero, partenerul
dumneavoastră nu are nici o opţiune de returnare, ı̂n afară de zero.

Dacă partenerul Dumneavoastră
vă trimite
veţi primi
Încercuiţi un număr pentru a-l returna partenerului dumneavoastră.
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Sfârşitul acestui experiment
După ce experimentul se ı̂ncheie, ne vom uita la câte jetoane aţi trimis partenerului. Vom lua acea sumă şi
vom vedea ce vă va returna partenerul dumneavoastră atunci când dumneavoastră ı̂i trimiteţi suma indicată.
38 As

in Appendix B, we only provide instructions for the send and return decisions of the paricipants from Udeşti when they
played with other participants from Udeşti. Instructions for Poieni and Ştirbăt were the same, with the name of the villages
changed.
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De exemplu, să spunem că alegeţi să trimiteţi 2 jetoane partenerului dumneavoastră. Acestea se ı̂nmulţesc
cu trei, astfel partenerului dumneavoastră ı̂i revine 6 jetoane. Atunci, ne vom uita la câte jetoane alege
partenerul dumneavoastră să vă returneze atunci când dumneavoastră alegeţi să ı̂i trimiteţi 2 jetoane.
Venitul dumneavoastră şi al partenerului
Veţi păstra fiecare jeton pe care alegeţi să nu ı̂l trimiteţi partenerului. De asemenea, veţi păstra toate
jetoanele pe care vi le returnează partenerul. La sfârşitul experimentului, fiecare jeton va fi convertit ı̂ntr-un
leu, iar plata se va face ı̂ntr-o săptămână.
Venitul dumneavoastră total = Jetoanele pe care nu le-aţi trimis partenerului dumneavoastră (=3 jetoane
– suma pe care o trimite Participantul 1) + Suma returnată de partenerul dumneavoastră.
Venitul total al partenerului dumneavoastră = 3* jetoanele pe care i le-aţi trimis – suma pe care
partenerul decide să v-o returneze.
Examples
EXEMPLUL 1: Să presupunem că dumneavoastră decideţi să trimiteţi 1 jeton partenerului dumneavoastră.
Acest jeton va fi ı̂nmulţit cu 3, ceea ce ı̂nseamnă că partenerul dumneavoastră va primi 3 jetoane. Să
presupunem că ı̂n căsuţa alăturată numărului 1, partenerul dumneavoastră va ı̂ncercui 2, ceea ce ı̂nseamnă
că acesta va returna 2 jetoane şi va păstra 1 jeton. Câştigul total al dumneavoastră este (3 - 1) + 2 = 4
jetoane. Partenerul dumneavoastră are un câştig de 3 – 2 = 1 jeton.
EXEMPLUL 2: Să presupunem că dumneavoastră decideţi să trimiteţi 3 jetoane Participantului 2. Aceste
3 jetoane sunt ı̂nmulţite cu 3, ceea ce ı̂nseamnă că Participantul 2 va primi 9 de jetoane. Să presupunem
că ı̂n căsuţa alăturată numărului 3, partenerul dumneavoastră va scrie 2, ceea ce ı̂nseamnă că acesta vă va
returna 2 jetoane şi va păstra 7 jetoane. Câştigul dumneavoastră total este de (3 – 3) + 2 = 2 jetoane.
Partenerul dumneavoastră are un câştig de 9 – 2 = 7 jetoane.
Un reprezentant Cult Research vă va ı̂nmâna un scurt test pentru a verifica dacă dumneavoastră aţi ı̂nţeles
cerinţele experimentului.
Desfăşurarea jocului
Aţi fost pus ı̂n legătură ı̂n mod aleatoriu cu un participant la studiu din Udeşti. Vă veţi juca acest joc
o singură dată. Vă rugăm să ı̂ncercuiţi un singur număr pe suportul de hârtie pe care vi-l va ı̂nmâna un
angajat de la Cult Research ı̂n scurt timp. La sfârşitul experimentului, vă vom converti fiecare jeton pe care
ı̂l aveţi ı̂n 3 lei.

C.2

Instructions: Return Decision

Acum veţi participa la acelaşi experiment la care tocmai aţi participat, cu excepţia că rolul dumneavoastră
va fi inversat. La fel ca ı̂nainte, vor participa la experiment un număr de persoane din Udeşti. Nu vi se vor
spune numele celorlalţi participanţi şi nici dumneavoastră nu veţi spune celorlalţi numele dumneavoastră.
Toţi participanţii vor avea aceleaşi instrucţiuni. Nu veţi fi pus ı̂n legătură cu aceeaşi persoană cu care aţi
corespondat ı̂n cadrul experimentului anterior. O să vă reamintim pe scurt ı̂n ce constă situaţia de decizie.
Situaţia de decizie
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Veţi ı̂ncepe experimentul cu 0 jetoane. Fiecare jeton este echivalentul a 3 lei, ceea ce ı̂nseamnă că veţi ı̂ncepe
experimentul cu un total de 0 lei. Veţi fi pus ı̂n legătură cu un alt participant din Udeşti.
Jetoanele trimise de partenerul dumneavoastră vor fi multiplicate de trei ori. Veţi putea returna zero,
câteva sau toate jetoanele primite de la partenerul dumneavoastră. Veţi păstra jetoanele pe care nu le-aţi
trimis partenerului.
Decizia dumneavoastră
Partenerul dumneavoastră va ı̂ncercui suma pe care el/ea decid să v-o trimită. El poate ı̂ncercui orice număr
cuprins ı̂ntre 0 şi 3.
Veţi primi de 3 ori numărul jetoanelor pe care partenerul dumneavoastră ı̂l ı̂ncercuieşte ı̂n materialul lui
printat. Nu veţi şti câte jetoane aţi primit de la partenerul dumneavoastră din Udeşti atunci când veţi lua
decizia. În schimb, veţi completa următorul tabel. Acest tabel arată câte jetoane se vor ı̂ntoarce la partenerul
dumneavoastră pentru fiecare număr posibil de jetoane pe care acesta vi-l va trimite. Veţi ı̂ncercui un număr
ı̂n fiecare dintre cele 3 căsuţe. Vă rugăm să fiţi atenţi la faptul că am ı̂ncercuit deja 0, deoarece aceasta este
singura dumneavoastră opţiune. Nu va fi nevoie să ı̂ncercuiţi altceva ı̂n această căsuţă.

Dacă partenerul Dumneavoastră
vă trimite
veţi primi
Încercuiţi un număr pentru a-l returna partenerului dumneavoastră.
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Venitul dumneavoastră şi cel al partenerului
Veţi păstra fiecare jeton pe care nu ı̂l veţi returna partenerului dumneavoastră. La sfârşitul experimentului
fiecare jeton va fi convertit ı̂n 3 lei şi veţi fi plătit ı̂n numerar ı̂ntr-o săptămână.
Venitul dumneavoastră total = 3*jetoanele pe care vi le trimite partenerul – suma pe care o returnaţi
partenerului.
Venitul total al partenerului dumneavoastră = jetoanele pe care acesta nu vi le trimite (=3 jetoane - suma
pe care nu v-o trimite) + suma pe care dumneavoastră o returnaţi.
Desfăşurarea jocului
Aţi fost pus ı̂n legătură ı̂n mod aleator cu un participant din Udeşti. Vă veţi juca acest joc o singură dată.
Vă rugăm să ı̂ncercuiţi un singur număr ı̂n fiecare căsuţă din materialul printat pe care vi l-a ı̂nmânat unul
dintre reprezentanţii Cult Research (nu va trebui să ı̂ncercuiţi un număr ı̂n prima căsuţă; am ı̂ncercuit noi
deja 0 pentru dumneavoastră). La sfârşitul experimentului vom converti fiecare jeton ı̂n 3 lei.
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